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ABSTRACT 
 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FRENCH LEFT AND RIGHT: THEIR 
APPROACH TO “THE TREATY ESTABLISHING A CONSTITUTION FOR 
EUROPE” AND “TURKEY’S ACCESSION TO THE EU” 
 
Ekin TÜMSAVAŞ 
M.A. in European Studies Programme, Thesis, 2009 
Dissertation Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ayşe Kadıoğlu 
 
Key Words: left-right dichotomy, French Socialist Party, Union for a Popular 
Movement, centralization, the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. 
 
The traditional left-right dichotomy played a crucial role in the world politics for 
over two centuries. Within time, the content and the scope of this dichotomy evolved; 
the differentiation that began with discussions on the political regime was later carried 
to the religious realm, and then was transformed into a dichotomy involving class 
conflicts. However, in line with the collapse of communism and the rise of new 
capitalist world order, the validity of this dichotomy has been questioned. Regarding the 
French case, as a result of developments in the international arena, the change in the 
 v 
statist structure of the French political tradition whose aim was to have state control in 
economics, was effective for the research of the blurring of the left-right dichotomy. 
While France was the birth-place of the dichotomy, at the same time it became the arena 
where this dichotomy has began to be questioned when the left and the right parties 
determining the political agenda began to converge to the centre. The positions and the 
changes experienced by the French Socialist Party and the Union for a Popular 
Movement as the two closest candidates to rule France gives important clues on the 
blurring of the left-right dichotomy. When the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for 
Europe and Turkey’s accession into the EU processes are evaluated, it is seen that the 
two leading parties in France were on the same side. These parties, while taking their 
positions on these two issues, rather than evaluating the situation at the European level, 
handled it in terms of its impact on the national level politics. These two parties’ 
attitudes of disassociating Turkey’s accession into the EU from the Treaty Establishing 
a Constitution for Europe all throughout the Constitutional Treaty referendum process 
was based on the understanding that the subject of Turkey should not harm the political 
positions they had adopted. At this point the aim was not to disturb the French 
electorate and not to decrease these parties’ voting shares, and thus in this issue 
pragmatism and actions to save the day were effective. For that matter, it will not be 
correct to speak of a certain left-right dichotomy. As a result, the left-right dichotomy is 
not kept alive by the two leading parties in the centre but by the parties radicalized in 
the political system, thereby the traditional left-right dichotomy left the scene to the 
centre-periphery dichotomy.  
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ÖZET 
 
FRANSIZ SAĞI VE SOLU’NUN KARŞILAŞTIRMALI ANALĐZĐ: “AVRUPA 
ANAYASASI SÖZLEŞMESĐ” VE “TÜRKĐYE’NĐN AB KATILIMI”NA 
YAKLAŞIMLARI 
 
Ekin TÜMSAVAŞ 
Avrupa Çalışmaları Yüksek Lisans Programı, Tez, 2009 
Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Ayşe Kadıoğlu 
 
Anahtar Sözcükler: sol-sağ dikotomisi, Fransız Sosyalist Partisi, Halk Hareketi 
Birliği Partisi, merkezleşme, Avrupa Anayasası Antlaşması. 
 
Geleneksel sol-sağ dikotomisi iki yüz yılı aşkın süredir dünya siyasetinde önemli 
bir rol oynamıştır. Süreç içerisinde bu dikotominin kapsamı ve içeriği evrilmiş; yönetim 
biçimine ilişkin tartışmalarla başlayan bu ayrım, dinsel boyuta taşınmış, sonrasında ise 
sınıfsal çatışmaları içeren bir ikililiğe dönüşmüştür. Ancak, komünist rejimlerin 
çökmesi ve kapitalist yenidünya düzeninin yükselişine bağlı olarak bu dikotominin 
geçerliliği sorgulanmaya başlanmıstır. Fransız politik geleneğinin ekonomide devlet 
kontrolünü esas alan devletçi yapısının uluslararası alandaki gelişmeler sonucu yaşadığı 
değişim, Fransa örneğinde, sol-sağ dikotomisinin bulanıklaşmasının araştırılmasında 
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etkin olmuştur. Fransa, dikotominin doğduğu yer olmakla birlikte, politik gündemi 
belirleyen sol ve sağ partilerinin merkeze yaklaşmalarıyla dikotominin sorgulandığı yer 
haline gelmiştir. Fransa’yı yönetmeye en yakın aday olan Fransız Sosyalist Partisi’nin 
ve Halk Hareketi Birliği Partisi’nin pozisyonları ve yaşadıkları değişimler, sol-sağ 
dikotomisinin bulanıklaşmasına ilişkin önemli ipuçları vermektedir. Avrupa Anayasası 
ve Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği’ne katılım süreçlerine bakıldığında Fransa’daki lider iki 
partinin de aynı tarafta yer aldıklarını görmekteyiz. Bu partiler iki konuda da pozisyon 
alırken durumu Avrupa düzeyinde değerlendirmek yerine ulusal düzeyde yaratabileceği 
etkiler kapsamında değerlendirmişlerdir. Bu iki partinin Avrupa Anayasası referandum 
süreci boyunca Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği’ne üyeliği konusunu Avrupa Anayasası 
sorunsalından ayırma çabaları, Türkiye konusunun, benimsedikleri siyasi pozisyona 
zarar vermemesi isteğindendir. Bu noktada referandum sürecinde Türkiye’ye olumsuz 
yaklaşan Fransız seçmenlerinin tedirgin edilmemesi ve bu partilerin oy oranlarına zarar 
verilmemesi amaçlanmış ve bu sorunsalda da pragmatizm, günü kurtarmaya yönelik 
yaklaşımlar etkili olmuştur ki bu noktada belli bir sol-sağ dikotomiden bahsetmek doğru 
olmayacaktır. Sonuç olarak artık sol-sağ dikotomisi merkezde yer alan iki lider parti 
tarafından değil siyasal sistem içerisinde radikalleştirilmiş partiler tarafından 
yaşatılmaya çalışılmaktadır ve geleneksel sol-sağ dikotomisinin yerini merkez-çevre 
ikiliği almıştır. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
  
Framework, Aim and Method of the Research 
 
 
After the dissolution of USSR and the breakdown of the communist regimes in 
Eastern Europe, there has been an ongoing debate among political scientists on whether 
the traditional left-right dichotomy is becoming increasingly blurry or not. The left-right 
dichotomy could be analyzed from two opposing perspectives: on one side, the 
advocates of the survival of the traditional left-right dichotomy and on the other side, 
those who reject it. The proponents of the former such as Ronald Inglehart, Hans-Dieter 
Klingemann and Norberto Bobbio argue that despite the fact that meanings and social 
basis of left and right have changed over time, the concepts are still alive and maintain 
continuity. On the other hand, proponents of the latter such as Alain De Benoist in 
contrast, argue that mainstream left and right political parties increasingly define 
themselves closer to the center; in other words, parties are more likely to take a centrist 
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stance on traditional right-left issues. According to those who find the traditional left-
right dichotomy meaningless, the main reasons for the convergence of the major left 
and right parties are the fall of the communist regimes in USSR and in Eastern Europe 
as well as the socioeconomic changes in Western Europe. These major breakdowns 
resulted in the reconstruction of both left and right discourses. On the one hand, the 
right lost its major enemy – communism-; on the other hand, the left learned how to 
make collaborations with its enemy –capitalism-.1 It would not be a mistake to view 
these changes as signs of pragmatism. Thus, the reconciliation of left and right spectrum 
could as well be regarded as an example of modus vivendi, a Latin term which usually 
describes informal and temporary consensus of two opposite sides in political affairs.2 
This modus vivendi could be associated with the advent of European Community and 
European Union politics since this kind of a supranational structure influences and 
determines the national politics leading to decrease of inter-party policy conflicts.3  
However, contrary to the attitudes of the political parties, as for the masses, 
Oddbjorn Knutsen argues that they are not less willingly placing themselves on the left-
right scale as Alain De Benoist claims. In other words, according to Knutsen, there has 
been “a stability in recognition of left-right scale”4 by the masses, hence somehow left-
right division persists and people still tag themselves as “left” or “right”. 
The transformations facing the French political tradition within the context of the 
international developments in world politics in the recent decades had an important 
                                                 
1 Rob Eisinga et al., “Convergence and Persistence of Left-Right Political Orientations 
in the Netherlands 1978–1995,” Economic Institute Report of Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, 1997. Available from 
publishing.eur.nl/ir/repub/asset/1417/eeb19960111120052.ps. Accessed 15 October, 
2008, 3–8. 
2 Bekir Berat Özipek, Muhafazakarlık, (Ankara: Liberte Yayınları, 2004), 156. 
3 Jocelyn Evans, “Europe and the French party system,” in French Party System, ed. 
Jocelyn Evans (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 155; Rob Eisinga and 
Philip Hans Franses, 8. 
4 Oddbjorn Knutsen, “Europeans move towards the center: a comparative longitudinal 
study of left-right self-placement in Western Europe,” International Journal of Public 
Opinion Research 10, no.4 (1998) Available from Oxford Journals 
http://ijpor.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/10/4/292. Accessed 15 October, 2008, 306. 
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impact on the choice of the French case regarding the blurring of left-right dichotomy. 
In this context, alongside the economic and political changes facing the world, France’s 
‘exceptional destiny’ underlined by Gaullism has also gone through many 
transformations. The idea of economic growth in a Gaullist perspective was directed by 
the French state and empowered by the public sector. Thus, a centralized state was 
designed to consolidate the national power further, to protect national sovereignty 
against the superpowers and to sustain social justice. Today, although the idea of 
economic growth remains central in the country, the state-led approach is not as 
dominant as it was in the past; nationalization has given way to privatization even under 
the Socialists. The new approach is associated with new determinants such as the 
market forces, global competition and economic rationalization. Thus, the 
‘distinctively’ France projected in the Gaullist discourse converged with European and 
international norms, especially in the economic realm. In that respect John Girling in his 
book “France: Political and Social Change” argues that the French mainstream left and 
right came to a consensus as reflected by the blurring of their former ideological 
confrontations when viewed from the perspective of accommodating politics to the 
needs of economic rationalization.5  
In terms of mainstream political parties’ programs, behaviors or their elites’ 
discourses, these parties act beyond their ideologies which inspired them for a long 
time. It is because either these ideologies became inapplicable or that they are now able 
to appeal to adequate number of electorates without mentioning these values.6  
Considering the clerical-anticlerical split, anticlericalism has become less 
meaningful because of the rapid urbanization which led to a significant weakening of 
clericalism. Besides, the class struggle concept adopted by the Communist Party has 
also become less enforcing as a result of the growing middle-class. Thus, it is only the 
foreign-born workers who consider themselves as the most under privileged class 
among the workers and attach themselves to the radical-leftist ideology. However, they 
did not generate a significant electoral power or are not yet politically socialized. 
According to William Safran, the ideological split between the mainstream political 
                                                 
5 John Girling, France: Political and Social Change, (London: Routledge, 1998), 1-2.  
6 William Safran, The French Polity, (New York: Addision Longman, Inc., 1998), 120. 
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parties defending liberalism and advocating interventionism was not a truly 
dichotomous split. Because mainstream parties on both sides of the political spectrum, 
from the UDF or UMP on the right to the PS on the left gave up the dirigisme on 
economy and embraced the neo-liberal values with emphasis on the benefits of the free 
market.7 
In addition to considering the foreign policy, there is no longer a significant 
division between the PS and UMP or UDF in various cases such as the participation in 
NATO, the nuclear strike force, and the Arab-Israeli conflict and the EU project in 
large.8 According to Emmanuel Todd, the establishment of ideological structures in 
France took centuries; however, they were liquidated in five years. Although, this was 
an overstatement, the emphasis of “all the major parties have been emptied of their 
traditional ideological content in much the same way as churches have been emptied of 
warships” is widely agreed on.9 In that respect, French electorates had a difficulty to 
associate themselves with a major party due to the fact that these parties no longer have 
significant differences regarding the outstanding political issues.10 
William Safran in his book “The French Polity” explains the developments which 
generated the ideologically non-descriptiveness of the major political parties in the past 
three decades in France. Firstly “the decline of the appeal of the Catholic church, which 
has drained the Right of its sociological substance; and [secondly] the decline of the 
“smoke-stack” industries, which has ended ‘the proletarian dream of the Left’”.11 
William Safran mentioned about the issues which provided an explanation for the 
growing irrelevance between the mainstream parties. Thus, he stated that beginning 
with the President Mitterand, the privatizations did not form a base for the left-right 
dichotomy. The major political parties embraced the free market in order to increase the 
French competitiveness in the global markets. In that respect, the basis was politicians’ 
                                                 
7 Ibid,, 120. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid,, 121. 
10Ibid. 
11 Ibid,, 121. 
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individual power positions and ambitions forging the controversy between the 
mainstream political parties. Moreover, Safran added that in major political issues 
during the early 1990’s such as the Gulf War in 1991 and the ratification process of the 
Maastrict Treaty; the PS, the RPR and the UDF politicians took a similar position over 
the issues, albeit with some losses. 12 
It is now predictable that Europeanisation took the place of nationalization; 
besides the pluralist rather than a monist vision of the state, as well as the 
decentralization tendencies contrary to the centralization were embraced by the leading 
political parties.13 
The conflictual politics which characterized the traditional French political culture 
has given way to a relatively more consensual politics in the contemporary setting since 
the increasing social mobility and the economic transformations have softened the 
political cleavages and rendered partisan positions unimportant. 14 
The political cohabitation between the mainstream left and right and its legacy 
gave rise to a new consensual politics and to new forms of collective participation in the 
political sphere. Joseph Szarka argues that for some this consensual politics has been 
observed as an example of soft consensus leading to a minor disagreement rather than a 
major trauma.15 Considering the left-right dichotomy this entire transformation process 
specific to the French case is an indicator that this dichotomy is increasing becoming 
blurry.  
According to the recent French Sofres polls, French people who find left-right 
split meaningless increased from 33% to 56% in a period of ten years from 1981 to 
                                                 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid,, 124. 
14 Joseph Szarka, “the Parties of the French Plural Left: An Uneasy Complementarity,” 
in the Changing French Political System, ed.Robert Elgie, (London: Routledge, 2000), 
34. 
15 Ibid.,34. 
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1991 while those for whom the split has still meaning decreased from 43% to 33%.16  
These percentages are important because they indicate a discredit over the “left” and 
“right” notions and a conceptual transformation in a very short period of time. It should 
also be highlighted that this transformation, though it was a fact in all political circles, 
was experienced mostly by the left electorates.17  
Concerning the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (CT), the ‘French 
left’ case stands out among others in the European countries since it faced the most 
notable party factionalization. Before the CT referendum in France in 2005, the 
mainstream opposition party, the French Socialist Party (PS), held an internal 
referendum to determine its political stance regarding the CT. Of the party members, 
59% voted in favor of the ratification of CT and 31% voted against. Although the 
majority of the party members approved the CT and officially the ‘yes’ campaign, the 
outcome and the ‘no’ campaign within the party led by Laurent Fabius18 – the former 
Prime Minister of President Francois Mitterrand - was regarded as the indicator of the 
division within the Socialist Party. Due to the lack of strong leadership, the party did not 
discard the members of the ‘no’ camp nor did it censor them during the campaign. Ben 
Crum claims that factionalization is most likely to occur in opposition parties of a pro-
European persuasion.19 Despite the formal commitment of the PS and its leaders to 
                                                 
16 Alain de Benoist, “End of Left-Right dichotomy: the French case,” Telos, Vol. 102, 
(1995), 73 – 74.  
17 Ibid.  
18 Laurent Fabius’ attitude can be viewed as a political investment for future presidental 
elections. Aware of the fact that potential candidates of the next presidental elections 
supported the ‘yes’ campaign, he knew that a ‘no’ outcome would assure his legitimacy 
by taking the majority of public support. (Jessica Pennet, “Bir Avrupa Sorununun 
Önlenemez Millileştirilmesi,” in Seçim Zamanı-2, ed. Necati Özkan and Gülen Çetin, 
(Đstanbul: MediaCat, 2007), 92. Wolff and Mounier argue that Fabius treid to take 
advantage of the referandum “for his personal strategy within the PS since he tried to 
reposition himself as a more leftist leader” (Sarah Wolff and Gregory Mounier, “France: 
The Comeback of Political Parties.” European Constitutional Law Review, no.1, (2005). 
Available from Cambridge Journals. 
http://journals.cambridge.org/download.php?file=%2FECL%2FECL1_03%2FS157401
9605003834a.pdf&code=8a83a68a371b337913924f0d065b8fde. Accessed on 1 
November, 2008, 391).  
19 Ben Crum, “Party Stances in the Referandums on the EU Constitution.” European 
Union Politics, Vol. 8, no. 1 (2007). Available from Sage Publications. London:Sage 
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adoption of the ‘yes’ position, due to the active opposition of the ‘no’ advocates, the 
party faced a serious internal dissent on the issue of CT. The internal dissent could be 
viewed as the sign of a transformation/reconstruction process since it indicates the 
discontent of some groups toward the discourse on European issues.20  The fact that the 
PS was the only European Socialist Party to have split over the Treaty21 should be 
underlined as it shows the peculiarity of the French left’s standpoint. This 
factionalization within the PS is important in order to perceive the centrist stance taken 
by a camp within the party. 
The Socialist Party, as a more pro-European party than the Mouvement des 
Citoyens22 and the far left, does not share the same degree of Euroscepticism. However, 
since this research is preoccupied with the PS and its dynamics, other left-wing parties 
would not be discussed in detail through the thesis. When the Socialist Party began to 
embrace liberalization and privatization policies in the aftermath of Francois 
Mitterrand’s presidency in 1981, some key figures of the party such as Henri 
Emmanuelli and Jean-Luc Melénchon23 began to stand out in the party with their 
emphasis of Euroscepticism. The views of Henri Emmanuelli and Jean-Luc Mélénchon 
camp in relation to EU enlargement process were contrasted with those of the party 
leadership and majority of its members. Contrary to Henri Emmanuelli and Jean-Luc 
                                                                                                                                               
Publications. http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/8/1/61. Accessed on 1 November, 
2008, 67-73. 
20 Ibid, 67-73. 
21 Wolff and Mounier, 391. 
22 Le Centre d’Etudes, de Recherche et d’Education Socialiste (CERES) is one of the 
currents that led to the establishment of the Socialist Party during Epinay Congress in 
which Mitterand became first secretary.. Mouvement des Citoyens is a successor to 
CERES and to the Socialisme et République current. It was founded by Jean-Pierre 
Chevènement in 1993, a key figure of CERES as well, after his resignation from PS. 
Chevènement severly criticized PS leader Lionel Jospin for being close to multinational 
business, Europe or both. This special stance of MDC enabled the party to attract voters 
from the far Right (Andrew Knapp and V. Wright, The Government and Politics of 
France (New York: Routledge, 2006), 205. 
23 Former chèvementiste Jean Luc Mélenchon and former party treasurer Henri 
Emmanuelli were leaders of a traditional left-wing faction Nouveau Monde within the 
PS in opposition to Socialist majority (Knapp and Wright, 191.) 
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Mélénchon, the leading faction of PS approached favorably to the CT in order to 
maintain the forward march of Europe as did the Socialists in the past. For example, in 
contrast to the official position of the French left that approves Turkey’s membership to 
EU, Hubert Védrine, a former foreign minister and a member of PS, has said that 
Turkey was not in Europe, but in Asia Minor. Hubert Védrine’s approach is a good 
example in order to highlight the political rapprochement between the center-right and a 
part of the left-wing discourse. 
In the 2007 presidential elections, the Socialist Party’s discourse was reflected 
through the statements of Ségolène Royal, the deputy of Deux-Sèvres and the PS 
candidate. In a speech concerning the immigrants’ issue, by pointing out to the failure 
of Nicholas Sarkozy’s law-and-order policy, she declared that a much firmer policy was 
required. Antoine Lerougetel argues that “Royal’s statements, signifying the PS’s open 
abandonment of a social reform approach to the crisis facing youth in France’s urban 
ghettos in favor of a policy of repression, have been widely recognized as a significant 
shift to the right”.24 The 1993 Reform which was realized by the socialist President 
Francois Mitterrand in the 5th Republic ended the automatic acquisition of French 
nationality by the children of immigrants at the age of majority. In this context, the 
Socialists have acted in an exclusionary direction regarding acquisition of French 
citizenship indicating a convergence of the mainstream left and the right political 
positions in this particular case.25 
The aim of the current study is to reveal a special characteristic of the French 
political system on the hypothesis that the approach and policies of the French left does 
not differ from the French right on certain ‘key’ EU values. This means that there is a 
convergence tendency in the mainstream French context. In the frame of this research, 
the ‘approach to the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe’ and ‘Turkey’s 
accession to EU’ will be discussed. In other words, I will try to show that the left-right 
                                                 
24 Antoine Lerougetel, “France: Likely Socialist Party presidential candidate wants 
unruly youth drafted into the military,” World Socialist Web Site, 26 June 2006. 
Available from http://www.wsws.org/articles/2006/jun2006/frsp-j26.shtml. Accessed on 
1 November , 2008. 
25 Alec G. Hargreaves, Immigration, ‘race’ and ethnicity in contemporary France, 
(London: Routledge, 1995), 161.  
 9 
dichotomy has become blurry over the selected issues. The choice of the values is far 
from being random. Although it is expected that the left and the right adopt different 
approaches and policies on these issues, in the French context there is not a clear 
separation between the two wings in terms of attitudes. It should be considered that the 
French left is more likely to get closer to the French right concerning these issues. This 
distinctive aspect of the French left drove me to conduct a research on the similarities 
between the French left and right rather than their differences.  
In order to limit the scope and to make a comparative and general analysis, the 
research will focus on two major parties; one from the left-wing, the Socialist Party 
(PS); one from the centre-right, Union for a Popular Movement (Union pour un 
Mouvement Populaire, UMP). However, it should be indicated that in the research, the 
Rally for the Republic (Rassemblement pour la République, RPR) will be mentioned as 
the antecedent of UMP, and their rival the Union for French Democracy (Union pour la 
Démocratie Française, UDF). Based on the early Republican experiments France is 
currently going through the 5th Republic, a period which started with President Charles 
de Gaulle and marked by strong leaders such as Georges Pompidou, Valéry Giscard 
D’Estaing and François Mitterrand. Although the 5th Republic was established in 1958, 
the focus will be on the late 1990’s, the period in which the debates over the CT and the 
Turkish issue regarding her EU membership came to fore.   
 Following the literature review, the analysis will be based on the material 
acquired from the Charters of the chosen parties, their electoral campaign discourses, 
laws and regulations that they passed when they were in power as well as the polls 
conducted in France, and the regular surveys of EU. 
Chapter I will begin with a brief historical background of the concepts of ‘left’ 
and ‘right’ in the French political discourse, and then it will comprise the history and 
structure of the parties in question, their historical evolution and structures. I will briefly 
touch upon the previous four republic attempts and will mention about the electoral 
system in France but I will especially focus on the main stream left and right parties’ 
political evolution. In that respect, their doctrines, weakly institutionalized and highly 
centralized and personalized structures, their success in attracting members, the intra-
party tensions and their relations with EU Institutions will be discussed in the first 
chapter of the research. 
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The second and the third chapter will focus on the approach to “the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe” and to “Turkey’s accession to the EU” by the 
selected left-wing and right-wing parties respectively. These two key issues will be 
explained by using subheadings. The second chapter will focus on the CT and its 
perception by the PS and UMP.  After giving a brief account of the content of CT, 
discussions will concentrate on PS’s attitude toward the CT regarding the intra-party 
divisions, UMP’s attitude toward the CT, the impact of 2007 Presidential elections on 
CT, and finally the impact of CT on the Lisbon Treaty which was widely perceived as a 
reform treaty. I have to mention that besides these discussions, the main problematic 
analyzed in this chapter is PS’s and UMP’s positions regarding the CT. In that respect 
their referendum campaigns, the discourses and speeches of the key figures of these 
parties, the internal divisions and the expectations from the CT in line with their 
respective positions will be discussed.  
Chapter three will deal with the political attitudes of the selected parties on the left 
and the right toward Turkey’s EU accession process. In this chapter, besides explaining 
the official positions of  the PS and the UMP, President Chirac’s and President 
Sarkozy’s approaches, the impact of the Armenian issue on Turkey’s EU membership, 
and President Sarkozy’s the ‘Union for the Mediterranean’ project will be analyzed.  
In the forth chapter as a conclusion, a comparative analysis concerning these two 
issues will be presented in the light of collected information. 
The main purpose of the research is to highlight the peculiarity of the French left 
by emphasizing its rapprochement to the French right on the defined EU matters and 
consequently to demonstrate the dilemma within the French left. It is hoped that this 
research will provide a credible information base to the future researchers on French 
politics concerning these issues.  
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 Chapter I  
The Historical Evolution of the PS and the UMP 
 
 
 
 
1.1. Concepts of “Left” and “Right” in the French Political Discourse and 
Their Historical Evolution  
 
 
The debate over left-right dichotomy in French case becomes more interesting 
once it is found out that the French political system has been characterized by the 
duality between left and right for two centuries and that these notions are inherent to 
French political landscape. In his article “End of Left-Right Dichotomy: the French 
Case”, Alain de Benoist who is the leading French new Right philosopher gives a 
detailed background information about the concepts and their evolution through time. 
According to the general view, these concepts were first introduced in France on August 
28, 1789 during a debate over whether the king should have prerogatives over national 
sovereignty or not, and a right to veto or not. Those in favor of royal veto sat on the 
right of the speaker while their opponents sat on the left. So, the first left-right 
distinction which appears to be a topographical coincidence was made in France and 
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gradually expanded to Europe, then to the entire world.26 However, Pierre Nora argues 
that it took a long time for the two concepts to be popularized. They became part of the 
daily language during the Third Republic.27 
To be able to evaluate the current split of the concepts, it is important to give the 
historical evolution and the transformations they went through. After the Revolution, 
there were three main camps: supporters of the Republic, of the constitutional monarchy 
and of monarchy by divine rights. The debate over the political regime –whether it 
should be republic or monarchy- came to an end with the establishment of universal 
suffrage in 1875 and the definitive installation of a republic. Rightists and monarchists 
such as Louis de Bonald, Joseph de Maistre and their successors were marginalized.28 
So, this first phase of the left-right split was concerned with the political regime. The 
second phase in the left-right split was related to religion. Followers of the Catholic 
Church were placed on the right while anti-clerical, pure seculars were associated with 
the left.  This left-right division based on religious social order ended with the 
separation of the Church and the State in 1905.  
The third phase started with the emergence of capitalism that led to the class 
struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. After an interruption due to First 
World War, the left-right division continued and from then on, to be leftist meant not 
only to be republican or secular but also to be socialist or communist.29 So, meanings of 
left and right changed over time and finally came to be evaluated in classic-economic 
terms; the general division is based on “ownership of the means of production, 
distribution of income, and relative merits of the private versus the public sector”.30 The 
traditional interpretation identifies left with support for the controlled economy by 
government and the idea of economic equality for all, contrary to the right which is 
                                                 
26 De Benoist, 74; Ivan Ermakoff, Ruling Oneself Out, (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2008), 82.  
27 Marcel Gauchet, “La Droite et la Gauche”, 1993 quoted by Alain de Benoist,75.  
28 Özipek, 8.  
29 De Benoist, 76. 
30 Eisinga et al., 4.  
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identified with the support for a free market, privatization of industry, and continuity of 
economic inequality. 
The general dimensions of the dichotomy –“states versus markets, social 
liberalism versus social conservatism and the needs of the many versus the rights of the 
individual”- maintained continuity through the mid-to late twentieth century.31 
However, although the left established its raison d’être as the rejection of market 
economy and of private property by defending a planned, centralized and state-
controlled economy, by the end of Thirty Glorious Years of capitalism after World War 
II, the working class had become more reformist and consumerist. In the 1970’s the rise 
of the middle class reshaped the voting patterns, the salaried middle class tended to vote 
for the left contrary to the self-employed who voted for the right. So, the left- right split 
dynamics of 1960’s – to be Catholic or to belong to working class- were not conformed 
to the 1970’s context. The late 1970’s witnessed the weakening of the sense of 
belonging to a social class. According to the opinion polls this was a fact that affected 
mostly the working class.  
From 1980’s onwards there was no significant difference between policies of the 
left and the right. The emphasis of right was relatively more on liberalism and free 
market economics and less on social programs while that of left was the opposite. For 
example, in the French case not only did the left accept the institutions of the 5th 
Republic and principles of nuclear deterrence but the right also compromised with the 
Left over the issues such as abortion, death penalty, models of authority in the family 
and society. In addition, they both chose to adopt the same policies once they came to 
power. Since 1981, they hardly embraced different policies over economic issues. Serge 
Latouche argues that both left and right “laid claim to the legacy of the 
Enlightenment”32, however they did embrace it partially. On the one hand, right 
sacralized progress, science and technology; it celebrated individual liberty and constant 
economic growth. On the other hand, left supported well-being for all. As Latouche puts 
                                                 
31 Eric D. Beinhocker, The Origin of Wealth: Evolution, Complexity, and the Radical 
Remaking of Economics, (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2006), 416.   
32 De Benoist, 79. 
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it, despite crisis and shocks “the modern state has achieved all that”.33 From this point 
of view, we may say that left and right complement each other. 
Besides their compromise over economic and social issues, political corruption of 
politicians representing the left and right poles, leaders’ empty promises during 
electoral campaigns, and the fact that political game turned into a media show also 
contributed to the cloudity of left-right division in the eyes of general electorates. All 
these factors gradually alienated them from their political engagements and weakened 
their ties to the conventional left-right split. 
 
 
 
1.2. Left-Right Dichotomy: Outdated or Still Alive? 
The conventional left-right categories are going through some kind of crisis and in 
recent years the distinction between left and right has been questioned. In his book “Left 
and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction”, Norberto Bobbio, while 
criticizing them, classifies various reasons of the opinion according to which left and 
right distinction had disappeared. According to him, this is due to “the so-called crisis 
of ideology”, which means that the era of ideologies has ended and hence, it is pointless 
to contrast the ideologies involved. However, Bobbio objects to this argument by 
indicating that the ideologies of the past have merely been replaced by others and that 
left and right are not only ideological expressions but also parts of everyday political 
activity. The second reason derives from the idea that two poles are not sufficient to 
divide the political space since a third one –the center-was introduced. Bobbio responds 
to this argument by underlining that the existence of a center does not mean the non-
existence of two opposite poles, left and right. In other words, even they come closer to 
the center by positioning themselves in center-left or center-right, they are still on the 
opposite sides of the political spectrum, they are still labeled as close to left or right and 
preserve challenging differences. The third reason for rejecting the conventional left-
                                                 
33 Ibid. 
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right dichotomy is the idea that it is no longer descriptive because new political 
problems and movements have emerged since the creation of the dichotomy. Therefore 
it is impossible to categorize the new movements such as the Greens or to resolve the 
new problems such as the environmental issue in terms of the conventional division 
between left and right. Bobbio concludes his theory by stating that left and right notions 
are relative and that one can not exist without the other. In other words, the left 
constructs its identity over the existence of the right and vice versa. There are periods in 
history during which the right (or the left) gains more power; however, the empowering 
of one pole does not mean the disappearance of the other. For example, Bobbio, 
contrary to those who consider the collapse of Soviet system as the end of traditional 
right and left dichotomy, views it as simply the end of a left-wing movement over a 
specific historical period.34 
According to those who argue that traditional left-right dichotomy became 
antiquated after the end of Cold War, left and right should be redefined or new 
categories should be introduced. Instead of “Right against Left” discourse, De Benoist 
proposes to “think in terms of establishmentarian ‘center’ versus all anti-system forces 
on the ‘periphery’.35 In that respect, the major parties of both sides of the political 
spectrum came closer to the center and the extreme ones were pushed to the periphery. 
In other words, he argues that center-periphery dichotomy used in a political context 
seems to meet the needs of the current political landscape more than the left-right 
dichotomy. 
Eric Beinhocker states that the left-right dichotomy survives, however he 
recognizes that the divide between two poles narrowed after the collapse of Berlin Wall. 
He marks the 1990’s as a defining moment since it was the period during which a third 
way was developed because both poles figured out that “extreme or purist 
implementations of their models simply do not work”. So, a pragmatic consensus was 
needed.36 
                                                 
34 Norberto Bobbio, Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction, 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 3 - 16. 
35 Martin A. Lee, The Beast Reawakens, (London: Routledge, 1999), 318 – 319.  
36 Beinhocker, 417. 
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Oddbjorn Knutsen conducted a study about eight West European countries, 
including France, in which political experts placed the parties on the left-right scale in 
their respective countries in 1982 and 1993. 37  He makes a distinction between the new 
party families such as green and radical right parties and the old traditional parties. The 
results of his study indicate a stronger polarization between the new parties along the 
left-right scale and a stronger centralization of traditional parties. Given the latter trend 
being stronger than the former, Knutsen concludes that “… all in all party polarization 
weakened”.38 In line with these data, in order to understand the current political stance 
of both the PS and the UMP, a brief account of their historical evolution will give a 
valuable insight.  
 
 
 
1.3.   A Brief History of the PS and the UMP 
 
 
The PS and UMP traditions in the French politics are the two major political 
forces determining the political sphere of the French society on the basis of mass 
political culture on the left and the right of the French political spectrum. Although 
these two main actors of the French political life generally have different approaches 
over the actualization of policies and embrace different preferences, they share a similar 
party structure. 39 They both are relatively new established parties.  
The Socialist Party was founded in 1969, and the UMP in the period of 2002 
Presidential elections. But, their impact on French polices has started long before these 
                                                 
37 Knutsen, 295. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Robert Elgie and Steven Griggs, French Politics: Debates and controversies, 
(London: Routledge, 2000), 97-99.  
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dates. The French Socialist Party is the offspring of the 1905 French Section of the 
Workers’ International (Section française de l’internatonale ouvriere – SFIO). The 
right-wing UMP was rooted in the conservative RPR and the Gaullist traditions 
indicating the peculiarity of the French politics providing for political parties’ easy 
dissolutions and reappearances with a new “name”. These leading parties are weakly 
organized.40 Lawson and Colette Ysmal argue that “the French political parties have 
never been strong agents of participatory linkage” leading to a low membership. Only 
the Communist Party achieved a million party members in 1945-1946, which also 
decreased to half a million in 1950’s. In 2000’s, only one percent of the eligible 
citizenry were party members. For that reason, French political parties look more like 
“cadre” parties than the mass parties.41  
In relation with this weakly institutionalized and highly centralized structure, 
these major forces of the French political sphere are highly personalized. The key 
figures of these parties determine the “party opinion” to a great extent. The presidential 
nature of the political system in the 5th Republic was also effective in the establishment 
of a “personalized” culture. For example, President François Mitterrand was the leader 
of the PS for “nearly a quarter of a century” - from 1971 to 1995- as the first party 
secretary and then  from 1981 to 1995 as the spiritual chief.42 Besides the previous 
features of the PS and UMP, these parties have usually been exposed to an internal 
factionalization which damaged their popular image. If these parties face lack of strong 
leaders such as Charles De Gaulle, Georges Pompidou or François Mitterand, the 
leadership struggle emerges that complicates the adoption of a decision with 
consensus.43 The key figures in these parties engage in attempts to use the leadership 
gap for their own benefits. For example, Laurent Fabius’ attempts in PS during the 
Constitutional Treaty had been observed as a tactical move in order to acquire the PS 
leadership. Contrary to the party’s official ‘yes’ position headed by François Hollande, 
                                                 
40 Ibid. 
41 Colette Ysmal, “French Political Parties and Linkage,” in Political Parties and 
Political Systems: The Conception of Linkage Revisited, ed. Andrea Römmele, David 
M. Farell and Piero Ignazi (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2005), 62-63.  
42  Elgie and Griggs, 101.  
43 Ibid. 
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Laurent Fabius led the “no to the Constitutional Treaty” campaign which gave rise to a 
significant decrease in PS electorate’s support for the CT.44   
The so-called “parties occupation of the state” occurred in 1960’s and 1970’s but 
reached its peak point in 1980’s,45  for instance the case of 1960’s UDR - state of 
President De Gaulle or the 1980’s PS - state of President Mitterrand. The party 
occupation of the state resembles to that of “The Party Government Model”. In that 
model, the party and the government were interlinked. The Presidents were always 
parties’ strong figures and during their presidential terms they “have been “de facto” or 
even “de jure” party leaders”.46 As Laurent Fabius used the inter-party conflict on the 
CT issue in order to acquire the leadership position at PS, in a similar manner, as Ysmal 
argues, if the party leaders and sub leaders occupy the key party positions for their own 
benefits, they also tend to use the public resources to the benefit of their parties which is 
also directly related to their own interests.47 That is why in 1960s, many people have 
been actively working for the party in order to acquire a significant appointment if the 
party reaches to rule the country. 
 
 
 
1.3.1.  The PS: From a Class-Based to a Nation-Based Party  
 
 
Being the oldest existing mass party in the country the Socialist party was 
founded in 1905 under the name of French Section of the Workers’ International 
(Section française de l’internatonale ouvriere – SFIO) with the aim of uniting four 
                                                 
44 Wolff and Mounier, 391.  
45 Ysmal, “French Political”, 78.  
46 Elgie and Griggs, 114 -115. 
47 Ysmal, “French Political”, 78. 
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different approaches to socialism: utopian, syndicalist, revolutionary, and reformist. 48 
Rather than merely being Europeanists, French Socialists defended internationalism 
“proudly claiming the heritage of Jean Jaures and the Second International”.49  
Although its orientation was democratic like the German SPD and the British Labor 
Party,50 its socialist program was formulated in terms of doctrinaire Marxism;51 class 
struggle was its far most motivating principle and the party did not even hesitate to 
destroy capitalism.52 In this context, the party took strict measures against the 
infiltration of the electorate of the left-of-center middle-class parties.53 However, when 
the 3rd French Republic seemed to be in danger it entered into coalitions with the 
bourgeois parties. For example, the party became part of the government in 1914 for the 
defense of France against Germany.54  
The Communist Party of France (FCP) was “founded in 1920 at the Congress of 
Tours held by French Section of the Workers’ International (Section française de 
l’internatonale ouvriere /  SFIO) when around three-quarters  of the delegates decided 
to join the Third International” which had already been set up by the Russians after the 
Bolshevik Revolution.55 Foundation of the French Communist Party (FCP) directly and 
negatively affected the SFIO in relation to its social basis which made it much more 
difficult for SFIO to only appeal to the working class. But it was still supported by the 
civil servants such as the teachers, and the people living on fixed income. Moreover, it 
                                                 
48 Safran, 76.  
49 Alistair Cole, “The French Socialists,” in Political parties and the European Union, 
ed. John Gaffney (London and New York:Routledge, 1996), 71.  
50 Safran, 76.  
51 Garbriel A. Almond, et al., European Politics Today (New York:Longman, 2002), 
173.  
52 Knapp and Wright, 186.  
53 Almond et. al, 173.  
54 Safran, 76.  
55 Ibid., 82.  
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had also some strongholds among the “wine-growers of the south, devotees of 
republican ideals, of anticlericalism, and of producers’ cooperatives”.56  
In 1936, SFIO, under the leadership of Leon Blum headed the antifascist “Popular 
Front” government which included bourgeois Radical Socialists. During the Second 
World War certain Socialist politicians allied with the non-Socialists in the lines of the 
Resistance against Germans.57  In the aftermath of the Second World, in 1956, the SFIO 
leader, Guy Mollet, won the premiership with the discourse of reaching peace in 
Algeria. However, the war became intense when new conscripts were sent to fight. Due 
to fierce discussions within the party regarding the war in Algeria, sending conscripts to 
fight and the attitude toward the new constitution led to a split in the ranks of the party. 
A minority group left the party in September 1958 to form the Parti Socialiste 
Autonome which later united with other small groups to form The Parti Socialiste Unifie 
in 1960.58 Concerning the European issue the Socialist-led government of Guy Mollet 
(1956-57) took an active role in the negotiation and ratification processes of the Treaty 
of Rome with the reservation that enough safeguards be added in order to limit the 
transfer of national sovereignty.59  The economic advantages considering the free 
market economy envisaged by the Treaty of Rome disturbed SFIO’s Marxist discourse 
of defending the rights of the laboring classes.   
SFIO began to experiment with different alliance strategies. SFIO made alliances 
with the anti-Gaullist central parties including the Christian Democrats.  For example, 
in 1963 some SFIO politicians supported the presidential candidacy of Gaston Defferre, 
the anti-Communist mayor of Marseilles. When SFIO obtained only 5% of the votes in 
the presidential elections of 1969, and upon increasing internal strife, it was disbanded 
and was succeeded by the Parti Socialiste (PS). 60 The reawakening of the party in the 
                                                 
56 Almond et. al., 173. 
57 Safran, 76. 
58 Knapp and Wright, 186 – 187.  
59 Cole, 72.  
60 Safran,  77 – 79. 
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French political sphere had begun with 1970’s under the François Mitterrand 
leadership.61  
With the Épinay Congress in June 1971, François Mitterrand became the first-
Secretary of PS.62 Revival in the left began with François Mitterrand’s leadership in PS. 
François Mitterrand was a pragmatic leader. In 1971, he organized a strategy called “the 
class front”. It was aimed at the creation of an alliance between the middle class 
(employers, middle managers) and the working class. François Mitterrand’s tactic was 
to attract more electorates and he succeeded in this within time.63 Moreover, he aimed 
to get the votes of the different factions of the left.  
François Mitterrand knew that in order to increase his power communist votes 
were a must. One year after his leadership, he signed a common program with the 
communists in order to get the support of the communist electorate. This successful 
attempt made it possible to attract three million of the total five million PCF votes.64 
Under François Mitterrand’s leadership considering Guy Mollet’s SFIO pro-EC 
policies, pro-Atlantic attitude were transformed to a tougher anti-Americanism and 
more reserved attitude towards the EC. This policy change was an indicator of 
reproaching the Gaullist foreign policy.65  
In 1974 presidential elections, François Mitterrand, by appealing to the united 
Left, was only 400.000 votes short to beat the right-win candidate Valéry Giscard 
d’Estaing.66 François Mitterrand successfully united the leaders of the small parties of 
the non-Communist left, as well as the regionalists and the ecologists under the 
                                                 
61 Knapp and Wright, 189 – 190.  
62 Knapp and Wright, 188.  
63 Ysmal, “The French Political”, 67. 
64 Ibid.  
65 Cole, 72. 
66 Ibid., 188-189.  
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umbrella of PS and even got significant number of votes from the communists. His 
leadership traits to unite the left brought him the presidency in the elections of 1981.67  
François Mitterrand, by also dominating and directing the communists, filled the 
leadership gap in the left since Leon Blum. In the aftermath of the 1981 Presidential 
elections, in Pierre Mauroy’s government under François Mitterrand presidency, four 
Communists were appointed as Ministers. Considering these appointments, the PS 
obtained the leadership of the left. Although the alliances between PS and the 
Communists succeeded to conquer the Presidency and the Premiership, some left-
wingers took an abstention position or even dispersed towards the far-right Front 
National.68  
Since 1888, the PS has been divided into two factions; a left-wing minority and a 
mainstream majority. The mainstream has been dominated by the potential presidential 
candidates. During the 1980s, the PS won the presidential elections and was in 
government except the right-wing government between 1986 and 1988.69 However, in 
the early 1990s, the mainstream majority’s success began to erode. With the scandals 
and the ongoing recession, PS’s votes came under 20 per cent; the PS lost the 
government and was damaged by the Prime Minister Pierre Beregovoy’s committing 
suicide in 1993.70 
French Socialist Government’s priority between 1981 and 1983 was to protect the 
national sovereignty. Like their British partners, the French Socialists were cautious 
over initiatives at the European Community level regarding the EC institutional 
reforms. For example, they had serious doubts and reservations about the EP’s draft EU 
Treaty (TEU) of 1984 regarding the transfer of power from the national institutions to 
the EU. However, while Mitterrand embraced an intergovernmental model of EC 
decision-making as had the previous 5th Republic Presidents, he acted more willingly 
towards EC’s institutional reforms. President Mitterand’s European model included 
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68 Knapp and Wright, 189. 
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strong intergovernmental elements but he also welcomed the federalist developments if 
they promoted the French interests. President Mitterand’s ratification of the “European 
Central Bank” (ECB) could be observed as a noticeable step toward supranationalism.71 
The establishment of an independent ECB with two basic dimensions of political and 
economic independence as one of the major reforms, as envisaged by TEU, led to the 
diminishing of national interference at the European level.72  
Although President Mitterrand was successful in unifying and dominating the left 
politics, there were also fierce debates regarding the ownership and management of the 
major enterprises in the country. During the 1970’s and 1980’s the great debate within 
PS was over “nationalization” versus “privatization” of enterprises. The PS agreed to 
the privatization of enterprises nationalized in 198173 and the Socialists recognized that 
it was impossible for France to compete in the global market while insisting on 
protectionism since there was no choice except integration with the global markets. 
Therefore, the national governments accepted the major principles of liberal economy; 
such as free circulation of goods and capital. The nation-states “must give up exchange 
controls, allow free competitive play between interest rates and must stabilize 
currencies”. As the Gaullists did, the Left also applied these global market rules since 
1983 by indicating specific reasons and excuses.74 
Contrary to the traditional socialist rhetoric, privatization increased its pace in 
France in the early 1980’s. At the end of 1980’s ideological contradictions and 
confusions on the party program within the party ranks began to come to the fore. The 
conflict was “between two ‘cultures’ within French socialism: (1) Jacobin, centralist, 
etatist, nationalist, and protectionist; and (2) decentralist, pluralist, regionalist, and 
European.”75 Due to the threat within the party and from its left-wing alliances, 
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President Mitterrand decided that it would be the best alternative to reconcile the free 
market economy with public management of the resources.76 
Unemployment had always been a concern for the French people. But this turned 
into an anxiety during the ratification of the Treaty of European Union. The French 
public had asserted its doubts regarding the gains to be obtained from the ratification of 
the European Monetary Union and the establishment of an independent European 
Central Bank due to the economic drawbacks for France. .77 For instance, the failing 
value of Euro one year after its acceptance as a single European currency disturbed the 
French people and triggered the protests accusing the European Integration for the ills 
that the French economy would soon face.78 The negative attitude of the French people 
toward the European Integration had an adverse impact on the PS.  
The crises in the Socialist Party began to surface in the early 1990’s when a 
significant number of former party supporters accused the party to have lost its 
dynamism and reformist attitude on the problems of immigration, student unrest and the 
problem of unemployment. The PS and the government began to loose their credibility 
due to various scandals involving the ministers, unethical business practices such as 
bribes, the transfusion of AIDS-contaminated blood. These problems did not only put 
the PS in a precarious situation, but also significantly decreased the public support 
given to President Mitterrand and his rating sunk to below 30 per cent.79 It was not only 
the PS that lost votes during this period.  
The PCF that had a key place in the French political sphere began to erode. In this 
context, Francois Hincker argued that by the late 1980’s, the collapse of communism as 
an alternative to capitalism had adversely affected the FCP and the party could not 
benefit from the Socialists’ crisis. The demise of the communist world order prevented 
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PCF to attract votes from the other left parties.80 In addition to having difficulties to 
enlist new members, there was also a widespread despair within the party. During the 
crisis years, it was only the Green movements which asserted themselves to the French 
political sphere as a left alternative. 
The rise of unemployment rates in the early 1990’s, the unending party leadership 
struggles within the ranks of PS had a negative impact on the PS electorates and led to 
the mobilization of party members against the government during the Maastricht Treaty 
Referendum which in turn decreased the PS’s popularity and credibility over its 
electorates.81  In the summer of 1992, it was expected that the President, the socialist 
leaders and the most of the conservative opposition would support the Treaty. It was 
also calculated that the referendum process would positively affect the Socialist Party’s 
1993 Legislative Election campaign and reverse the decreased support and popularity of 
the Socialist Party.82 However the PS, in alliance with the relatively small Left Radicals, 
had experienced one of the worse failures of its history then the numbers of seats 
decreased from 277 to 57.83 The 1993 parliamentary election defeat led the PS to be in 
search of a “wider alliance” considering the French left. Especially from 1994, the PS 
aimed to form an alliance based on “common interests”. The Green movements’ best 
performances had occurred in the Socialists’ ineffective years of 1992 and 1993.84 The 
1992 Referendum campaign on the Treaty of European Union, the dramatic decrease of 
parliamentary seats in 1993* and the loss of seats in 1994 European elections 
accelerated internal party rivalries. In 1995, the PS had difficulties in finding new 
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members and the membership decreased to a hundred thousand.85 The Greens benefited 
from the failures of the PS and increased their votes and popularity.  
The PS’s intentions forming “gauche plurielle” were to restore their dominance 
and leadership within the left. But, Lionel Jospin’s attempt was different than that of 
Mitterrand’s old union of the left which occurred in 1974. Mitterrand aimed to attract 
the Communists’ electorates; however Lionel Jospin’s attitude was to maintain the 
strength and the credibility of its allies as long as they remained in the tent. The 1994 
“gauche plurielle” had also included small leftist groups; the Left Radicals - close allies 
of the Socialists since 1972 - and the chevenmanist “Movement des Citoyens” (MDC).86  
Toward the presidential elections of 1995 conflicts within the PS were still 
unresolved. There were internal factors which affected the PS’s 1995 Presidential 
election candidate. The capability and popularity of the possible PS candidates were in 
question.87 During the first term of Mitterrand’s presidency, Lionel Jospin’s unaltered 
loyalty to President Mitterrand strengthened his position within the party. Lionel 
Jospin’s unaltered loyalty to President Mitterrand in the first term, the decrease of 
Michel Rocard88 popularity after the 1994 European and Regional Elections defeats, 
Laurent Fabius’89 “contaminated blood transfer scandal”, investigations against Henri 
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Emmanuelli for corruption, and Jacques Delors’ decision not to run for presidency were 
the factors increasing Lionel Jospin’s chances for candidacy.90The weak performances 
of the PCF and the Greens’ candidate Dominique Voynet in the 1995 Presidential 
elections contrary to Lionel Jospin’s strong performance revived the Socialists’ claim of 
being the leader of the left-wing coalition. The supporters of PCF and the other left 
parties, especially the Green movement, voted for Lionel Jospin in the second round of 
the 1995 presidential elections. The left compromised on a common candidate for the 
second round of the elections which indicated that in eyes of the electorate left-right 
dichotomy prevailed since in the second round, the runoff was between a Gaullist and a 
Socialist candidate.91  
From its establishment in 1905 till the mid 1990’s, the PS had undergone radical 
changes regarding its social basis as well as its ideological discourse and political stance 
in the French political sphere. At first it was a Marxist and internationalist working class 
based party, then it became an amalgamation of working class and middle class party 
with the emergence and development of FCP, then it formed alliances with the non-
Gaullist central parties acting as the leading party of the Popular Front, then made 
alliances with the communists and other small left parties till it managed to be the 
governing party in the 1980’s. The trajectory of the PS indicates that the party 
transformed itself from a working-class based party to a nation-based party. Anti-
Germanism brought by the World Wars, the Algerian war and the process beginning 
with the Treaty of Rome as well as the collapse of Soviet Union  were the cornerstones 
of this transformation. The changing political conjuncture in the world politics shaped 
the political stance of PS. 
The convalescence of the French Left which began with the second round of 1995 
Presidential elections led to an unexpected recovery in 1997 Parliamentary elections.92 
Lionel Jospin’s government interiorized sufficient elements in order to acquire other 
left-wing groups’ supports. When Lionel Jospin came to power in June 1997, his 
economic policies were designed to respond to “the Socialists’ campaign promises to 
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reduce unemployment, to retain the essentials of the welfare state, and to make France 
ready to participate in the European monetary union.”93 The PS’s discourse embraced 
“the 35-hour working in a week, better job opportunities for the young, change to the 
immigration laws passed by the right-wing government and a moratorium on the 
construction of new nuclear power stations.” 94 Among these, creation of 700,000 new 
jobs with half of them in the public sector, decreasing the workweek from 39 hours to 
35 hours without lowering the wages, increasing the minimum wage for the lowest level 
wage earners by keeping most of the current socioeconomic rights were reiterated by 
Lionel Jospin government.95  Especially the 35-hour working week could be seen as the 
most effective tool in embracing the left. The Civil Solidarity Pact served to increase 
Lionel Jospin government’s reputation and credibility as well as generating a 
convergent programme with the market. In many respects, the Lionel Jospin 
government had been successful. His struggle against “unemployment” was rewarded 
with the creation of a million new jobs in four years. The unemployment rate had 
decreased to just 9 per cent, which was over 12.5 percent in the mid-1990’s. All of this 
was quite in line with Lionel Jospin’s motto of “A market economy but not a market 
society!”96  
However, The Civil Solidarity Pack and the “revolutionary” 35-hour working 
week were somewhat populist policy tools cleverly formulated by the Lionel Jospin 
government. Too few benefits of the program reached the working class and the white-
collar employees who were the reservoir of the Left. The 35-hour working week had 
negative repercussions for them due to having “less convenient working hours, tougher 
production targets and stagnant or falling purchasing power”.97 When unemployment 
began to rise back after the mid-2001 and Lionel Jospin was not able to stop it, he began 
to focus on law and order in his campaigns which did not appeal to the working class 
voters of PS.  His program began to target the center voters and the differences between 
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Lionel Jospin and Jacques Chirac programs were blurred. Besides, there were many 
other alternative candidates in the center each offering to do more regarding job 
protection and security from crime which led to “the dispersal of the left-wing votes” in 
the first round. Lionel Jospin could not get enough votes from the center either and was 
faced with elimination. 98 
Toward the 2002 Presidential elections divergences between various leftist groups 
were increasing. Especially the “European Integration” and the “Capitalist Global 
Economy” constructed the two major issues of conflict.  Therefore, each component of 
the “gauche plurielle” campaigned for its own candidates; Lionel Jospin for the PS, Hue 
for the Communists, Noel Mamere for the Greens, Chevenement for the MDC, three 
Trotskists; Languiller, Becancenot and Glukstein, and Christiane Taubira for the Left 
Radicals campaigned for the Élysee Palace. When put together, the total score of the 
eight candidates at the first ballot was close to 43 percent, but the fragmentation of the 
left prevented any left-wing candidate to run for the second round. With these abysmal 
results which led to Lionel Jospin’s unexpected withdrawal from politics,99 the need for 
the left for a “gauche plurielle” became a must for the upcoming elections.100 The 
sudden defeat and departure of Lionel Jospin did not create a leadership vacuum in the 
PS. This gap was filled with a politically skillful and capable socialist figure, François 
Hollande. 101   
François Hollande became famous as having patience, good humor and ability to 
consensus-building. His success was appreciated with the strong Socialist results at the 
2004 regional and European elections. However, President Chirac’s announcement for a 
Referendum on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe revealed the PS intra-
party dissent. Although, the internal PS referendum results led to an official adoption of 
‘yes’ position, the division over the CT would not be underestimated. The powerful PS 
figures such as Henri Emmanuelli, Jean-Luc Mélénchon and Laurent Fabius did not 
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approve the official position and resisted by continuing on the “no” campaign up to the 
polling day.102 
 
 
 
1.3.2. The UMP formation: A Gaullism without any clear references  
 
 
According to Knapp & Wright, René Rémond argues that there were three 
different right-wing political traditions in the 19th century France. The first was the 
“ultra right” movement “which rejected all republican values and sought to restore the 
pre-revolutionary Bourbon Monarchy”. The “moderate right”- called the “Orleanist 
Right” - was the second tradition. The moderate right advocates were “ready to 
compromise with moderate republicans and attached … to the British virtues of 
moderate constitutional monarchy and free-trade”. The last one was the “Bonapartist 
Right” which “stressed the virtues of strong leadership with direct links to the mass of 
people, a strong state and an assertive foreign policy”. Rémond also suggests that these 
19th Century right-wing traditions had given rise to the successors in modern terms.  
These successors are: the non-Gaullist moderate right as the heirs of the “Orleanists”, 
the Gaullists as the inheritors of Bonapartist Right, and the ultra-right as the “others” 
like Front National. Rémond emphasized that the Christian Democracy in France was a 
less determinant factor than the one in Germany or Italy.  Even though Christian 
Democracy in France has still an impact over the right-wing electorate, it could not 
place itself within a definite party formation.103 
Although De Gaulle placed himself as a power above the “left” or “right” wing 
parties, he formed a delicately organized right wing party named “The Union pour la 
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Nouvelle Republic” (The Union for the New Republic - UNR). Among all the right-
wing political parties, UNR, the first right-wing party in the 5th Republic, had a “clearly 
defined leadership” and “a more disciplined organization”.104 With the establishment of 
the 5th Republic the Gaullist Party’s feature of embracing a broad coalition of groups 
and classes, including the working class, differentiated itself from the traditional 
conservative parties. Between 1958 and 1974, Gaullists retained both the presidency 
and the premiership.105 As was the case with the PS-state under François Mitterrand 
presidency, from 60s till the early 70s a rapprochement between the Gaullist party and 
the state bureaucracy was observed. The Gaullist party members benefited from their 
strong alliance with the President. The party did not only conquer the premiership and 
most of the government portfolios, but the party members also captured the key 
positions in nationalized industrial firms and banks.106 
The period from the referendum in 1962 which made to directly elect the 
President and the parliamentary elections in the same year till the March 1973 
Parliamentary elections, just before Georges Pompidou’s death, Gaullism lived its 
Golden Age. These glorious years of Gaullism and its dominance over the French 
people was never reached “under any French republican regime”. The proliferation of 
the Gaullist doctrines based on “the primacy of national unity and a denial of the 
Marxist notion of class struggle” took place during the period of 1962-1973. The 
Gaullist principles also included the preservation of a powerful French state while 
establishing a strong executive authority, the creation of a modern French industry and 
defending national independence in foreign policy.107 
Three years after the ratification of the Treaty of Rome, General De Gaulle held a 
press conference on the Construction of Europe where he stated that “[they] must not 
proceed on the basis of dreams, but on the basis of realities”, and he clearly defined the 
location of states in a new European order by stating that “to imagine that we can built 
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something above and beyond these States which will work effectively and enjoy 
popular support is an idle fancy.” In the same Speech he further expressed his 
inalterable belief that the nation states were the only legitimate sources of political 
authority which differentiated his approach from that of the supranationalist Jean-
Monnet and Robert Schuman. According to Charles De Gaulle, the European 
Community could work over the “technical issues” as long as nation states remained as 
the main decision making mechanisms.108 
Although, it was widely argued that the Common Market initiative was a 
supranational expansion, it was only adopted by Charles de Gaulle to increase the 
French benefits notably for the farming sectors through the Common Agricultural 
Policy. Moreover, the idea behind fostering special relations with Germany was to 
acquire a leading role in the new European order. The national sovereignty and the self-
determination were the main Gaullist policy objectives which could not be opened to 
negotiation. In this regard, “the resistance to the federal model of European Integration” 
had become a fundamental element of 1960’s Gaullism.109 Thus, the ex-Premier Paul 
Reynaud’s critic of Charles de Gaulle’s foreign policy was significant. Paul Reynaud 
argued that “De Gaulle wanted France to be at the head of Europe whilst not wanting 
there to be a Europe”. However, his statement did not exactly reflect President de 
Gaulle’s European vision. Still conserving the French national sovereignty and nation-
state authority, President Charles de Gaulle emphasized the need of constructing a non-
federal powerful Europe which would emerge as a “third force” in world political 
sphere, independent from the United States and the Warsaw Pact.110  
The Community level politics concerning the qualified majority voting 
demonstrated one more time the Gaullist resistance to the European institutions. The 
French boycott of the Council (the so-called “Empty Chair Crisis”) for six months 
ended with the Luxembourg Compromise of January 1966 which allowed France to 
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keep the veto power in reserve where the French vital interests were imperiled111 
indicating the Gaullist reservations towards the Community level issues. 
In 1966 Charles de Gaulle allowed his Prime Minister Georges Pompidou to 
become the party leader.112 Georges Pompidou, as a successor of the charismatic 
leadership of Charles de Gaulle, endeavored to ensure “sans de Gaulle”, a Gaullism 
without de Gaulle. In this context he intended to create a better party structure and a 
central authority which carried the torch of Gaullist principles and ideals.113 The party 
membership has reached 160 thousand and was doubled by 1968 when compared to the 
early 1960’s. This increase was mainly due to two reasons: strengthening of the party 
organization and public reaction against the May 68 events.114  
During Georges Pompidou’s leadership, relations with the United States were 
improved and the admission of Britain into European Community membership was 
actualized. These facts showed that Pompidou created a more accommodating 
statesman figure by maintaining the “self-determination” and the national sovereignty 
of France.115 However, in the parliamentary elections in March 1973 the party lost 2 
million votes and over 100 of its deputies. As a result the party had become the largest 
component of a conservative coalition together with the Centrists and Giscard’s 
Républicains Indépendants.116 This was an indicator of the harm made to the 
unquestionable Gaullism in the eyes of the public. Chaban-Delmas who served as the 
prime minister during the Georges Pompidou presidency was seen as the heir due to 
Georges Pompidou’s illness. His poor performance opened the avenues for Valéry 
Giscard D’Estaing’s presidency.117 After the death of both Charles de Gaulle and 
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Georges Pompidou, in 1974, Valéry Giscard D’Estaing - a pro-European and more 
Atlanticist politician - became president with the elections. D’Estaing was a 
conservative but not a Gaullist.118 Valéry Giscard D’Estaing positioned himself as an 
alternative to both the Gaullists and the Left and got the support of the mainstream 
electorate. Upon succeeding in the first ballot, he developed a tactic by appealing to 
Gaullist voters with the motto of safeguarding the institutions of the 5th Republic and 
thus secured his election in the second round.119  
Valéry Giscard D’Estaing’s political leadership began with the Republican Party 
in 1962 and was strengthened with the establishment of the centre-right Union for 
French Democracy party (UDF). The Union for French Democracy (UDF) was the 
outcome of Valéry Giscard D’Estaing’s ‘The Republican Party’ (RP). The RP came to 
surface in 1962 by the efforts of a few conservative deputies who were opposed to 
President De Gaulle’s unfavorable vision of European unity and his referendum on 
direct elections for the presidency. When in 1974, Valéry Giscard D’Estaing became the 
President; he made an effort to unite the parties of the center and the right. As a result, 
in 1978, the Union for French Democracy emerged as an alternative center-right party 
which included “the Giscard’s Republicans, remnants of a Catholic Party (CDS), the 
once militant anti-Catholic Radicals, and some of former Socialists”. However, the 
UDF remained a party of notables and did not become a mass party and failed to 
establish an effective organizational party structure. Even two years after getting 207 
seats in the parliament at the end of the 1993 Legislative elections, the UDF had still not 
more than 38.000 members.120 Even if Valéry Giscard D’Estaing seemed to appeal to 
the centre, from the Leftist perspective they were not different at all than the Gaullists 
and positioned themselves in the right. Its electoral base composed of the “shopkeepers, 
farmers, professionals, middle and upper echelon white-collar employees and the 
pensioners”.121 
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During his presidency, the improved relations with the European Community had 
been internalized as a source of “threat” by the classical Gaullists. In June 1977, with 
the passage of the Bill in France that ratified direct elections to the European Assembly, 
Gaullist policy of cohesion on Europe got the first serious blow which indicated the 
obvious split over the Community affairs within the Gaullists. While some, such as 
Jacques Chaban-Delmas and Olivier Guichard, were opposing to any drift to 
supranationalism but favoring full participation in the Community, others led by Michel 
Debré - the chief architect of France’s Constitution and first prime minister of the Fifth 
Republic - believed that the direct elections to the European Assembly could damage 
the French national sovereignty and interests, and could harm France’s leadership role 
in the Community.122 
Gaullists having experienced big crises after the parliamentary elections of 1973 
and the death of Georges Pompidou established a mass party to relaunch itself in 1976. 
123 Jacques Chirac was such an energetic and ambitious personality that the excitement 
he created activated the Gaullist party. Jacques Chirac was elected in a Soviet-style 
way, receiving 96.5 per cent of the votes. After its establishment, RPR succeeded to 
become a centre of attraction by increasing its members to 550 thousand at the end of 
1977 and then to 750 thousand in 1978, in a period of just one year. Since the Gaullists 
would not act with the SP and the Communists, they did not react against the UDF 
government under Valéry Giscard D’Estaing presidency.124 The electorate formation of 
the RPR was more restricted than the old Gaullist party’s; it was in accord with the 
classic conservatism and also included the well-defined constituencies of the right.125 
During a trip to United States in 1983, President Chirac declared that “Gaullism is a 
pragmatic way of thinking, not a doctrine. It was changed with a changing world. No 
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one knows what General De Gaulle would say if he were here today, but I think he 
would say the same as I do”126. 
Jacques Chirac, in late 1970’s, in order to form a “power base” for the 1981 
Presidential Elections, had taken a stance with the old-guards and asserted his doubts 
about the proposed European Parliament. Jacques Chirac was also against the Spanish 
and Portuguese application for EC membership “on the grounds that Iberian 
competition would destroy the fruit farming and wine growing south-west of France”.127 
Due to the powerful Mitterrand Presidency and the rise of the Socialist Party, the RPR 
was not able to set the political agenda. Jacques Chirac’s defeat in the Presidential 
Elections of 1988 against Mitterrand demonstrated Jacques Chirac’s and the RPR’s 
inadequacy to appeal the French electorate.  
Till the mid of 1980s Chirac was a Eurosceptic, and was more attached to the 
national sovereignty and national issues, more dirigiste on economy and more 
authoritarian. With “The New Right Agenda” and the platform established with UDF in 
1986, Chirac started the renovation process within the party and offered a new policy 
with major revisions in the Gaullist programme which included “privatization, business 
deregulation, law and order as well as a degree of support for the Atlantic alliance and 
Europe”.128  
In the late 1980’s Jacques Chirac renewed his severe and antipathetic discourse 
over the European Integration and became an advocate of the Integration. During the 
Maastricht Treaty Referendum process, Jacques Chirac was pushed to take a pro-
European position. In the referendum process, Jacques Chirac wanted to legitimize his 
position within the party and to attain the party’s mainstream support for his candidacy 
in the presidential election thus he could take an opposing position in connection with 
the pro-European centre-right majority stance and he unenthusiastically supported the 
Treaty. He realized that anti-Europeanism would not be enough to form a presidential 
candidacy. Besides, having the support of the center, to demonstrate his loyalty to De 
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Gaulle by giving references strengthened his position over the party members. That’s 
why Jacques Chirac denounced that the Maastricht Treaty reflected the peak point of the 
General De Gaulle’s European vision. That emphasis is notable because the RPR’s key 
figures such as Jacques Chirac, in order to legitimize their moves, frequently gave 
references to De Gaulle. But, different factions within the party had different emphases 
on President De Gaulle’s ideas. That’s why, it is also possible to say that the Gaullist 
vision of Europe have become blurry and open to interpretations. For instance, in the 
same period and over the same issue - the Maastricht Treaty - Jacques Chirac’s and 
Philippe Sequin’s emphases of Gaullism differed from each other. While Jacques 
Chirac was referring to a constructive Gaullist vision of European Integration Philippe 
Séguin introduced De Gaulle’s principles of national sovereignty and the “French state 
grandeur”. 129  
 The 1981 Presidential Elections was a defeat for Valéry Giscard D’Estaing and 
opened the way for the Gaullist RPR to become the leading party in the right. When 
Valéry Giscard D’Estaing lost the second round of elections by 48.24% to François 
Mitterand’s 51.76%, the non-Gaullist right-wing electorate accused Jacques Chirac of 
“premeditated treachery”.130 With the right-wing defeat in 1981 Presidential elections, 
the loss of the parliamentary majority to the Socialists, and the unexpected rise of the 
extreme nationalist and the far-right Front National under Jean-Marie Le Pen’s 
leadership, the RPR and the UDF could not risk exclusion at the second ballot, and were 
thus obliged to cooperate in the elections at all levels.131 Created in 1972, the Le Pen 
movement was an amalgamation of nostalgic Vichy government defenders, neo-fascists, 
intellectuals and the Le Pen sympathizers. The aim of Front National was to pull the 
French extreme right back to the parliamentary arena.132  
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Jean-Marie Le Pen’s move in the extreme right was seen as a threat to their 
dominance over the right-wing electorate. Thus, the RPR and the UDF could not stay 
neutral, and they decided to act in favor of a joint list for the 1984 European Elections. 
As a result, the joint UDF-RPR list under the Simone Veil leadership had got 42.9 
percent of the votes and 41 seats in the parliament (UDF had 21 and RPR had 20 seats) 
against the 20.8 percent votes and 20 seats of the Socialists. Besides the relative success 
of the right, the 1984 European Elections demonstrated the need for alliances within the 
right wing parties for the future elections and the need for a renewal of the RPR.133 The 
renovation of RPR could be viewed as a transformation in the highly centralized 
command structure of the party which could bring new chances for different tendencies 
and factions to form their own positions within the RPR.134   
The ascendancy of the National Front created confusion within the RPR and UDF. 
When Jean-Marie Le Pen got 14.5 per cent of the votes in the first round of the 1988 
Presidential Elections, the political cadres in the right-political spectrum felt it like an 
earthquake. This revealed out the divisions in the rights. While some Gaullists aimed 
the Le Pen votes in the second round, some other Gaullists defended that they should 
have nothing to do with the extreme-right Front National. Besides the Gaullists, some 
UDF politicians even thought that President Mitterrand would be a better choice in 
preserving the national unity of France.135 This shows that this initiative of Jean-Marie 
Le Pen which was ignored at the beginning of the elections by the right-wing majority 
had led to a serious division. The leaders in RPR and UDF began to face the dilemma of 
protecting their political stance or preserving their electorate base.  
With the party’s 1985-86 manifesto of Le Renouveau, RPR’s 1979 European 
programme stressing the national sovereignty and the grandeur of French state has 
undergone a radical change. Pacte RPR Pour La France forming the basic framework 
of the manifesto touched upon the necessity of a European free-market, with special 
attention to “the consolidation of a real single market, the free movement of capital, the 
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emergence of economic policy, the strengthening of the European Monetary System and 
the harmonization of legislation.”136   
At the European level, after the 1984 European Elections, although the right-wing 
parties were going through a rénovation process and were questioning the needs for 
alliances, they faced a division during 1989 European Elections process. Except a joint 
UDF-RPR list under Valéry Giscard D’Estaing a centrist list under Simone Veil 
participated in elections.137 However, it was not the Socialists who benefited from the 
center-right division. The Jean-Marie Le Pen’s list achieved a great success and won 10 
seats in the European Parliament. In a political sphere where the two major right-wing 
parties acted as the strongest supporters of the European Community and the European 
Integration, it was only Jean-Marie Le Pen left to protect the French Identity and to act 
as the proponent of a Gaullist-style “Europe des patries”.138  
During the first years of 1990’s, the prominent division within the Gaullist RPR 
was about “European Integration”. The RPR, like its UNR and UDR predecessors, 
embodied different political leanings such as economic dirigistes and liberals, social 
conservatives and progressives.139 Due to the emergence and flourishing of different 
groups and factions, and the lack of strong leadership, the post-Maastricht period was 
becoming problematic era for the RPR.140 
The RPR was encountered with a division during the Maastricht Treaty 
referendum process. Although the party leadership and the center supported the Treaty 
of European Union, the key figures such as Philippe Séguin and Charles Pasqua formed 
an alliance to form “A Rally for No in the Referendum” campaign over the Treaty issue. 
They shared a common vision over the dissonance between the European Integration 
and the preservation of national sovereignty. Philippe Séguin emerged as the defender 
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of the Gaullist national sovereignty ideals, expressed the nation-states’ roles as the 
guarantors for a perpetual peace in Europe. He found the Maastricht Treaty 
incompatible with the 5th Republic Constitution and strengthened his opposition to the 
‘l’Europe de Maëstricht’ which was denounced as “federalism on the cheap, 
fundamentally anti-democratic, falsely liberal, and technocratic through and through”. 
Charles Pasqua’s opposition to the Maastricht Treaty incorporated the more populist 
approaches and xenophobic sentiments when compared with Philippe Séguin. He was 
against a Europe without internal borders and voting rights for foreigners in French 
municipal elections.141  
In the early 1990’s, the irrepressible decline of the Socialist Party encouraged the 
right-wing parties, especially the RPR. As a result, the increase in the right-wing votes 
was determinative in the 1993 Parliamentary Elections and in the 1995 Presidential 
Election. Even the RPR had got 242 of the total 577 seats in the parliament; it was not 
the sole alternative for the right-wing electorates because the other right wing party-the 
UDF- had also won 207 seats in the elections.142 The 1995 Presidential Elections gave 
the chance to rebuild the RPR as the major right-wing party. However, due to the 
political crisis beginning just after the summer of 1995 and the tragic loss of seats in the 
1997 Legislative elections exacerbated divisions within the party.143 The sociological 
analysis of the electorate in the first ballot legislative elections of 1997 which was 
published by Le Monde in 5th of June 1997 demonstrated that the RPR’s voters “were 
most likely to define themselves as being on the right, were most anti-left, were most 
positive toward business and parochial schools, were most likely to vote for personality 
rather than ideas, and were least supportive of woman’s rightg to abortion”.144 
Although the Gaullist myth viewed the institution of presidency as a structure 
above the parties, during both Charles De Gaulle and Georges Pompidou presidency, 
they continued to act as leaders (“locomotive”) of the party. However, Jacques Chirac’s 
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presidency was different than both Charles De Gaulle’s and Georges Pompidou’s. 
Philippe Séguin was elected party leader by RPR and with the support of the party 
members he did not act in accord with President Chirac. From 1997 till 1999, President 
Chirac tried to destabilize Philippe Ségiun’s leadership, a project in which he 
succeeded. Philippe Séguin resigned from the party membership in the middle of 1999 
European Elections, then his secretary-general Nicolas Sarkozy – Édouard Balladur’s 
budget minister and presidential campaign director- also resigned from the party after 
the poor results of 1999 European Elections. By the year’s end, Michèle Alliot-Marie 
became the first women in RPR’s president position. 145 President Chirac’s intention to 
preserve support of the party as well as his ambition of reelection in 2002 Presidential 
Elections led to the splits and damaged the party’s organizational structure. 
There were four reasons why two powerful parties of moderate right - the Gaullist 
RPR and the Valéry Giscard D’ Estaing’s UDF- did not merge into a single big right-
wing party. The first reason was their different policy objectives on sovereignty, the role 
of the state in the economy and especially on European issues. It was not surprising that 
the RPR was the one which preserved the national sovereignty and more dirigisme on 
economy. Secondly, their organizational structures differentiated. The RPR intended to 
form a mass party and paid attention to the party membership. But, contrary to the RPR, 
the UDF showed a relatively more disorganized party structure, emphasizing a noble 
and elitist formation. Thirdly, they did not make concessions; they did not step back 
during the Presidential Elections and supported their own candidates rather than come 
up with a joint candidate. Lastly and the most simply, they did not expect a significant 
electoral benefit from merger. The French electoral system allowed them to form a 
second-round alliance when it was needed and led them to survive separately. By 2000, 
except the last one, these defined reasons’ significance has diminished.146 
The decrease in right wing electorates toward the RPR and the incapability of the 
UDF and Démocratie Libérale ( Liberal Democracy / DL) gave a momentum to the 
efforts initiated by the deputies - especially the younger members - of these right-wing 
parties in order to establish a new powerful right-wing power and to monopolize the 
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moderate right’s share of public political finance. Although President Chirac stayed 
neutral toward the new party till the last minute, support of senior members of his stuff 
for the initiative affected President Chirac’s position on new project as well. In 2002 
Presidential Elections first ballot results accelerated the project. Both the PS candidate 
Lionel Jospin and President Chirac’s rivals in moderate right- François Bayrou and 
Alain Madelin- were defeated after the first ballot. The elimination of moderate right-
wing figures at the first ballot justified the exigence of a new formation and thus the 
umbrella initiative named Union for a Popular Movement emerged.147 
The UMP, with President Chirac’s reelection and under the Jean-Pierre Raffarin’s 
leadership showed notable success in a very short period. As an umbrella formation, the 
UMP won 369 out of 577 seats in the parliament after the 2002 Parliamentary elections. 
These 369 seats consisted of the RPR’s 205, UDF’s 77 and DL’s 57 seats. In addition, 
by November 2002, 166 of 321 Senators jointed the UDF ranks. The rise of the newly 
established UMP led to the dissolution of the RPR and DL. It was only the UDF which 
has survived as an independent party but never became a powerful choice for moderate 
right electorates.148 
The two basic problems of the right wing parties – the low membership and the 
institutional weakness- adversely affected the UMP. Besides these problems emerged a 
struggle for leadership.  Alain Juppé, UMP’s leader, was observed as President Chirac’s 
“proxy”. However, in 2004, Alain Juppé “was convicted for his role in financing RPR 
officials to the city of Paris payroll and banned from public office for 10 years. 
Although an appeal reduced the length of the penalty, Alain Juppé progressively 
withdrew from public political activities over the following year” 149. Therefore, in 
November 2004, Nicolas Sarkozy- the most popular minister in Jean-Pierre Raffarin 
government- won the UMP’s leadership with 85 per cent support of party members. 
Knapp and Wright argued that Nicolas Sarkozy became popular in the party, impressed 
the younger members even the long standing activists by his “energy, gift for self-
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publicity, talents as a media performer and relative youth”.150 As a result, his aggressive 
leadership enabled him to be the most appropriate candidate for 2007 Presidential 
Elections; consequently he became the 6th President of the 5th Republic. 
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Chapter II 
Attitude of the PS and the UMP to the Issue of the Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe 
 
 
 
 
Just after President Jacques Chirac declared that the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe (CT) would be ratified in consultation with the French public 
with a national referendum, an era of intra-party divisions and the rise of rivalries 
between the French parties began. In France, the CT was not only perceived as a reform 
at the EU level, but was also seen as an issue in the domestic French political agenda.  
In addition, contrary to the leading parties’ official positions - the governing UMP and 
the main opposition party PS - and their ‘yes’ campaigns, the unexpected ‘no’ results on 
29 May 2005 led to a turmoil both at the national level  and at the EU level politics. For 
that reason, discussion of CT’s impacts on the French political agenda and the leading 
parties’ strategies and expectations from the CT is significant. Moreover, the French 
referendum’s specificity arose from its ratification process. For instance, the Dutch 
referendum which was held on 1 June 2005, just three days after the French referendum 
on the CT, resulted with a ‘no’ outcome as well.  The distinction between the two was 
that while the ‘no’ outcome of the French referendum could kill the CT; the Dutch one 
could only increase the doubts over the ratification process. In other words, after the 
rejection of the CT, the Dutch government would still have the option to ratify the CT in 
 45 
the Dutch parliament. Since the referendum was not legally binding. Thus, contrary to 
the French case there was the likelihood that the CT could be approved by the 
Netherlands.151  
In this chapter, the two leading political parties’ – the PS on the left and the UMP 
on the right- official campaigns, their leaders’ and party key figures’ discourses as well 
as the internal party divisions’ causes and consequences will be discussed. Besides 
these, President Chirac’s position, the major determinants of a ‘no’ vote in the French 
political context, the content and the intent of the CT and the CT’s impact on the 
following Lisbon Treaty will be thoroughly analyzed. 
 
 
 
2.1. The Path to and the Content of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for 
Europe 
 
 
At the end of the Laeken Declaration which was announced in December 2001, 
the European Union had reached a turning point regarding three critical issues: the 
geographical scope of the future Union, its institutional-constitutional status, and its 
regulatory aspect on which the political justifications and legitimacy would be 
erected.152 Thus, the Convention on the Future of Europe which was convened in March 
2002 in Brussels under the leadership of the former French President Valéry Giscard 
d’Estaing to address the key issues of distribution of power between the basic European 
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Union (EU) institutions and the member states engaged in a hard work on the basis of 
these critical issues to lay the ground for a Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe.   
The Convention on the Future of Europe encouraged the development of a new 
foreign policy for Europe so that Europe acted more coherently in foreign policy 
matters. It focused on how to strengthen the Union’s democratic legitimacy, and to 
redress the members towards of more integrated and unified Europe. The aim of the 
Convention was to develop a Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe to 
create a single document out of the four existing treaties. The draft was composed of 
four parts respectively: definition and objectives of the Union, EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, the functioning and policies of the Union, and the general and final 
provisions.153 
In July 2003 the Convention came up with a draft treaty creating a basis document 
for IGC (Intergovernmental Conference).  Then in October 2003 EU leaders met again 
for the IGC to give the final form to the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. 
An agreement was reached on most of the issues proposed on the draft treaty by 
December 2003. However, there was a dispute over the proposed voting rule changes. 
Poland and Spain were afraid that the simplified voting rules that the Convention 
proposed would favor the demographically larger member states, while the then valid 
weighted voting system favored the smaller and the medium-sized states. When Spain, 
under the new government, gave up its objection, Poland was alone and was forced to 
be more flexible. In June 2004, EU leaders gave its final form and signed it on 29 
October, 2004 and set the target date of November 2006 to put the constitution into 
force.154  
To become a Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, the CT had to be 
ratified by all of the 25 member states either by parliamentary approval or by public 
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referendum.155 At this point, due to the national referendums to be held in certain states, 
the ratification crises came into being. It became difficult to ratify the CT through the 
public referenda since the public was not well aware of the contents of the CT. The 
public had distrust towards their respective national governments, the opposition parties 
used the referenda opportunity as a tool for their election campaigns, and there was the 
fear from the bureaucratic structure of EU and finally the public’s doubts on EU’s 
enlargement policy, notably the case of Turkey’s membership into EU. Although the 
Netherlands and France were the founding members of the European integration 
project, the outweighing ‘no’ vote cast in the public referenda brought EU into a crises 
situation. What were then the key provisions and the new policies envisaged by CT 
leading to criticisms and public opposition to the referenda? 
In the 341 pages of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe text, the 
following key changes were proposed in order to create a more integrated and unified 
Europe:  
• The current six-month rotating European Council presidency would be 
abolished. “The European Council shall elect its President, by a qualified 
majority, for a term of two and a half years, renewable once.” The President 
“shall ensure the preparation and continuity of the work of the European 
Council”156, and “shall not hold a national office.”157 
• “The European Council, acting by a qualified majority, with the 
agreement of the President of the Commission, shall appoint the Union Minister 
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for Foreign Affairs.” 158 The task of the new EU Foreign Minister is to enhance 
“EU’s international visibility” by putting together the responsibilities of the 
Council’s High Representative for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) and the External Relations Commissioner.159 Furthermore, “the 
Union Minister for Foreign Affairs shall preside over the Foreign Affairs 
Council… [and would be] one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission”.160 
• The “Commission shall consist of a number of members, including its 
President and the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs”.161 During the first 
Commission whose term is from the time the CT is approved till 2014, each 
member state will retain one Commissioner.162 Thereafter, in order to overcome 
gridlock, the number of Commission members will correspond to “two thirds of 
the number of Member States, unless the European Council, acting 
unanimously, decides to alter this number.” 163 
• “The Union shall have legal personality.” 164 
• “The European Parliament shall, jointly with the Council, exercise 
legislative and budgetary functions. It shall exercise functions of political 
control and consultation as laid down in the Constitution.” In many policy areas, 
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including home affairs and agriculture, this CT would increase the co-decision 
rights of the European Parliament with the Council of Ministers. 165   
• “The Union shall recognize the rights, freedoms and principles set out in 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights”. 166 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the Union within the CT did not only include the Convention on the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms the Council of Europe adopted in 
1950, but also economic and social rights.167 
• “A qualified majority shall be defined as at least 55 % of the members of 
the Council, comprising at least fifteen of them and representing Member States 
comprising at least 65 % of the population of the Union. A blocking minority 
must include at least four Council members … When the Council does not act 
on a proposal from the Commission or from the Union Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, the qualified majority shall be defined as at least 72 % of the members 
of the Council, representing Member States comprising at least 65 % of the 
population of the Union.” 168 
• A ‘solidarity clause’ to be put into the CT to ensure that “the Union and 
its Member States shall act jointly if a Member State is the victim of a natural or 
man-made disaster, in particular terrorism”.169 
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Besides these new key provisions, considering several principles, the three 
respective competences - exclusive competence, shared competence and competence to 
carry out supporting, coordinating or complementary action - of the Union and the 
Member States would be determined by CT. These competences were governed by 
three principles: (a) the principle of conferral of competence at European level or at 
national level: the Union would have exclusive competence only in areas it is given 
authority by the Constitution; (b) the subsidiarity principle, where if and when the 
proposed action could not be achieved at the regional or national level, the Union would 
act; and (c) the principle of proportionality, where the Union’s action should de adapted 
to the set objectives. Moreover, while putting the competences into action, the Union 
Law and the Constitution would have priority over the Member States’ laws.170 
 
 
 
2.2. The Overall French Attitude towards the Treaty Establishing a Constitution 
for Europe 
 
 
In 1972, the French people paved the way for British accession to the European 
Community. Then in 1991, the French again made a referendum for the founding treaty 
establishing the European Union - Maastricht Treaty – and approved it with a small 
margin, with 51.05 percent ‘yes’ to the Treaty.171  Even if the support to the EU 
increased significantly, the French people still had reservations in certain areas 
regarding the EU policies. On 29 May 2005, France again went to the referendum for 
the future of Europe. This time with the adverse impact of the domestic political 
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situation and by considering prospective negative consequences on the economic and 
social French models - anti-ultra liberal and anti-Anglo Saxon social market economy 
and the government safeguarding social justice for the French citizens in general - to be 
brought in with the acceptance of the Constitutional Treaty, the Treaty was rejected by 
the French citizens in the national referendum held on 29 May 2005.172  
In 2005, four of the total 25 members of the EU have gone to national referendum 
for the ratification of the CT. France was one of them. France decided to take the Treaty 
to a referendum in July 2004173 with President Chirac’s initiative. Although the 
Referendum was originally planned for the late 2005, the Spanish referendum’s positive 
outcomes and the internal divisions in Socialist Party triggered the then President 
Chirac to move for 29 May 2005.174 
Participation of the French electorate into the 29 May referendum was high. At 
the date of the referendum there were 41,347,483 electorates, total votes cast were 
28,836,358 (69.7%), valid votes cast were 28,108,671 (97.5%). Voters were asked the 
question of “Do you approve the treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe?” While 
45.1% of those voted were in favor of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 
the remaining 54.9% voted against it.175  
According to Paul Taggart, there were four main reasons giving rise to the 
adoption of a referendum decision regarding the ratification of the Constitutional 
Treaty. The first was President Chirac’s attitude toward his rival Nicolas Sarkozy. 
President Chirac did not want to leave the floor to Nicolas Sarkozy for the proposition 
of a referendum and decided to act as the main decision maker. Secondly, President 
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Chirac realized that the referendum process would be difficult and could divide the PS. 
Thirdly, the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair decided to make a referendum in UK and 
this initiative domestically pressured President Chirac to the same in France. Finally, 
President Chirac thought that the ratification of Treaty by referendum would increase 
his popularity and the support for the government. The remarkable point of these 
reasons is that all of them are related to the domestic politics.176  
The debates over the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe were 
constituted by the issues of Turkey’s accession to EU, the Bolkenstein Directive and the 
Economy which were widely discussed in the meetings, on the TVs and in the press. In 
these discussions Turkey’s accession was effectively utilized by the right-wing 
Mouvement pour la France (MPF-Movement for France) party leader Philippe de 
Villiers. The right wing political leaders such as Philippe de Villiers and Jean-Marie Le 
Pen have correlated the constitutional campaign with Turkey’s EU membership.177  
The Bolkenstein Directive, being a liberal policy formulation on the services 
sector and the domestic market and being evaluated by the French public as the 
culmination of the liberal policies for EU from an Anglo-Saxon economic perspective 
took into consideration the inflow of ‘Polish Plumbers’ into France.178 In this context 
regarding the Bolkenstein Directive, Matt Qvortrup argued as follows:  
 
“[The Bolkenstein Directive] aroused the fears about a 
threat of an influx of cheap laborers from Central and Eastern 
Europe. And while President Chirac ensured that the directive 
was withdrawn, the theme of the ‘Polish plumber’ remained an 
Achilles’ heel for the pro-constitutionalists- and a godsend for 
the anti-constitutionalists, who skillfully played on the voters’ 
fears.”179  
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Thus, the ‘no’ camp focused on the possibility of future job losses of the French 
workers. They claimed that the Anglo-Saxon model, with its free trade principles, 
would pave the way for “an ultraliberal Europe”.180 It was thought that an ultraliberal 
Europe would damage French national sovereignty.  
The current economic problems and the future direction of the French economy 
was the third major issue in the debates where especially the adverse impact of rising 
unemployment was a serious concern discussed widely in the campaigns.181 These three 
highly controversial and debated issues damaged President Chirac’s presidential 
popularity and the credibility of Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin’s UMP 
government.  
EU was losing its international competitiveness with the rise of China and India as 
the new international competitors and the new dynamics of the world economy turning 
its way to Asia. With the creation, deepening and development of a powerful European 
market, EU would go a step forward in strengthening its international economic 
competitiveness. Acceptance of the Treaty with liberal overtones would pave the way to 
this aim. Thus, with this Treaty the strengthening European interests would directly 
enhance the national interests of the member countries. At this point, national leaders 
got the initiative for the acceptance of the CT. For instance, President Chirac, in support 
of a ‘yes’ to the Treaty, made a trip to Barcelona and delivered a speech on 11 February 
2005,182 long before the referendum in France. Back at home, the attitude of the French 
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electorate toward the CT was turning from an inclination to a ‘yes’ to an inclination 
toward a ‘no’ as the time for the referendum was getting closer and closer. The results 
of the polls conducted by CSA in 1-2 October 2003 gave 67 per cent ‘yes’ and 33 per 
cent ‘no’ and this picture turned around to be 48 per cent and 52 per cent respectively 
on 26-27 May 2005, just two days prior to the referendum. According to Henry Millner 
the opponents of CT claimed that the ratification of CT would accelerate social damping 
and that the low-paid Polish plumbers would take the jobs of the French tradesmen. 183 
Thus, it seems that the people had the instinctive fear that the burden to be brought by 
the new treaty would directly be born by them and that their living standards would 
decline. The problem was who would bear the burden of the transition phase and how it 
would be achieved. So the leaders, and President Chirac in the case of France, took the 
risk by taking the referendum to public vote. In this context, a ‘yes’ in Spain would be a 
convincing example for the French public relieving them of their fears.  However, this 
trip together with the confusion of the public regarding the pros and cons of the Treaty 
for the French national interests, gave rise to a division of the public opinion into two 
major camps: the ‘yes’ and the ‘no’, making the official position on the Treaty 
irrelevant.  
With President Chirac’s initiative the French people got the opportunity to 
directly decide on the nature and future of the EU. This leap forward by President 
Chirac and the choice between ‘yes’ and ‘no’ regarding the CT changed the course of 
the left versus right dichotomy. While there were certain splits in the right the major and 
the surprising division was in the PS ranks.184 
The advocates of ‘yes’ campaign in France were mainly directed by three camps: 
the UDF, the majority of UMP and the majority of PS. Their common argument was 
that this EU Charter would make the EU more democratic.185 Kalpyso Nicolaidis argued 
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that the ‘yes’ campaign got a wide and diverse support from “the mayors, artists, 
intellectuals, trade unionists, socialist leaders, and heads of states.” 186 Even President 
Chirac made an emotional speech on the TV assuring the French citizens that the 
Constitutional Treaty was “the daughter of 1789”.187 The ‘no’ camp was composed of 
the National Front, Philippe de Villiers and a part of UMP. The main argument of the 
‘no’ camp was safeguarding the sovereignty, which included “la grandeur de France”, 
and the protection of the French national interests. However, beside these right 
formations there was a strange Leftist coalition within the ‘no’ camp. This diverse Left 
spectrum covered the Trotskyite extreme left, the dissenting socialists, the Communist 
Party and the leftists’ anti-capitalist movement. The Leftist ‘no’ camp was defending a 
mythical plan to replace the CT which would lead to a wild capitalism that would put 
the welfare system in Europe at risk.188  This Leftist ‘no’ coalition worked hard and in a 
very organized manner effecting the decision of the electorates. According to CSA Polls 
while 60% of the electorates preferred to say ‘yes’, in February,  with this successful 
campaign the percentage of voters favoring ‘yes’ decreased to 49% in the middle of 
March. In the change of the behavior of the electorate people’s dissatisfaction toward 
the Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin government and President Chirac also played an 
important role. There was the fear among the French public that this Treaty would 
facilitate the enlargement process and that this would in turn decrease their living 
standards. Besides, they felt the threat that with the CT, the traditional state intervention 
in economic, social and cultural domains would be damaged. Although President Chirac 
led this referendum to increase his popularity and credibility, the outcome was a 
disaster.189 But the worst defeat was the PS’s defeat: over half of those voted for a ‘no’ 
rejecting their party’s position. In addition, 81% of the blue-collar workers, one of the 
main constructs of PS, voted ‘no’.190  
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As until 2007, there would not be another election, the French electorate saw the 
opportunity to express their protests to both the Prime Minister and the President. The 
pessimism related to the persistence on high unemployment rates, and the low 
popularity of both President Chirac and the government formed the basis of that kind of 
a protest.191 
A detailed analysis of the Eurobarometer post-referendum survey in France 
regarding the result of the referendum reveals out the following in terms of occupation: 
48% of the self-employees, 45% of the employees, 24% of the manual workers, and 
50% of those without professional activity voted for a ‘yes’.192 Hence, the manual 
workers had the lowest rate of approval for the Constitutional Treaty. This was the 
group which felt itself to be the most victimized. It is very likely that they believed that 
this Treaty would facilitate the EU enlargement process which would decrease their 
living standards due to the possible waves of cheap labor from the new members.  
According to Sylvain Brouard and Vincent Tiberj, there were four hypotheses 
which explained the results of the referendum. Firstly, considering the incompetence of 
the governments and the lack of political elites’ responsiveness, the French people, 
similar to the 2002 Presidential Elections, expressed one more time their dissatisfaction 
with the current political elites. It meant that the public, while rejecting the CT, also 
rejected the political elites. Second was the anti-European hypothesis: It is argued that 
the cleavage on Europe was different than the traditional left-right division. In addition, 
it was only among the highly educated, younger generations, and upper class who 
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favored the concepts of “multiculturalism, toward immigrant populations and other 
minorities, and European integration”. 193 
Thus, the French electorate also rejected this sort of a European integration. It 
would not be true to relate the CT with an anti-European stance only. The European 
level initiatives like the Bolkenstein Directive which was perceived as an ultra-liberal 
Anglo-Saxon model was criticized by the French electorate which meant that the French 
voter did not totally reject the idea of EU but criticized some EU level policies which 
formed the third hypothesis as “the EU-criticism hypothesis”. The last hypothesis was 
associated with Chirac’s Presidency. President Chirac’s unpopularity and the 
government’s inability to solve the problems formed the fourth hypothesis called “the 
executive popularity hypothesis”.194 While considering the ‘no’ outcome and the 
conflicting attitudes of the two main actors, PS on the left and UMP on the right, these 
hypothesis should be kept in mind.   
Paul Taggart argued that there were three major aspects of the outcomes of the 
Referendum on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. First, the Referendum 
campaigns demonstrated “the nature of the party competition both in and between 
parties” 195, second, the ‘no’ campaigns in different political parties and groups were 
diverged from each other which meant that the ‘no’ to the ratification supporters stayed 
in different spectrums constituted different perceptions over the CT and European 
integration. Third, the ‘no’ camps within these diverged parties on the French political 
scale emphasized different objectives for the Treaty. The left opposition accentuated “a 
defense of a vision of a ‘Social Europe’; however the right-wing opposition focused “on 
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the themes of sovereignty and fears about French identity, as well as an embrace of anti-
globalization themes by some”. 196  
The ‘no’ outcome in the French referendum may give the reader the impression 
that there was a strong Eurosceptic trend in France. Beginning with the rejection of the 
European Defense Treaty in 1954 by the French National Assembly, then the “empty 
chair crisis” under General De Gaulle Presidency, the narrow pass of the Maastricht 
Treaty referendum were the basic examples which indicated the French cautious stance 
over the European integration. For that reason, the revival of the French Euroscepticism 
was not a new phenomenon during the CT referendum campaigns.197 The traditional 
French vision of European integration was based on the intention of controlling and 
directing the trajectory of the European project. As stated by Paul Hainsworth some of 
the French electorate who voted against the Treaty also emphasized that France should 
reveal its pivotal role on the European integration.198 For that reason, the situation in 
France is rather different than the traditional Eurosceptic perception.  
According to Markus Wagner, as Paul Taggart divided the Euroscepticism into 
two, the “soft” and the “hard” one, France faced the “soft” tide meaning that 
Eurosceptics were not against “the very idea of European integration and as a 
consequence [to] the EU”199, but that they had concerns on the current EU political 
forms and were in harmony with the pro-European sentiments. The “soft” 
Euroscepticism is further divided into two, the “policy” and “national-interest” 
Euroscepticism. “Policy Eurosceptics oppose specific areas of integration, while 
national-interest Eurosceptics oppose certain aspects of the EU because membership is 
seen as a limitation on sovereignty. Policy and national-interest Euroscepticism are not 
mutually exclusive categories.”200  The ‘no’ wing of France adopting the “soft” 
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Euroscepticism was not against the idea of an integrated Europe, but was against the 
current CT and the integrated Europe it envisaged.   
The ‘no’ result at the end of the national referendum in France forced President 
Chirac to change Jean-Pierre Raffarin’s premiership. Just after the polls closed, 
President Chirac delivered a speech on the TV to the French electorate due to their 
‘concerns and worries’ where he emphasized the need for a renewed impetus in the 
government.  The next day the Jean-Pierre Raffarin government resigned and on 31 
May it was replaced by Dominique de Villepin.201 The resignation was announced by a 
statement to the French by President Chirac in Paris on the same day when he evaluated 
the referendum results and gave a future prospectus to the French people. In this 
statement he said that the ‘no’ vote did not mean the rejection of the European ideal, but 
that it called for action regarding the major problems facing the French citizens such 
unemployment, decreasing purchasing power and the threat facing the French social 
model. His message was that in order to safeguard this French model, France had to be 
more active, had to involve herself by playing her full role in Europe rather than 
isolating the country and turning inward. The model that France would struggle for 
within Europe was not an Anglo-Saxon model. It was a model “founded on dynamism 
and individual initiative, on solidarity and social dialogue.”202 Considering that model 
the new government used the 2004 slogan- “the social cohesion.” The new cabinet was 
also formed by UMP politicians as only one ministry was appointed from the UDF who 
did not embrace the UDF party principles at all.203 
According to the Le Monde, TNS-Sofres polls conducted in France on 29 May 
2005 regarding the “winners and losers” of the referendum, within the left, Laurent 
Fabius was the one of the least beneficiaries from the wining ‘no’ campaign. On the 
other hand, for many other observers, on the right political spectrum Nicolas Sarkozy 
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was the most beneficiary of the referendum results. Since he became the Interior 
Minister and also continued to lead the UMP.204 Even tough the governing UMP’s 
political position was not embraced by the people in general, Nicolas Sarkozy came out 
of the referendum with the gain of these two titles. While not decreasing his credibility, 
these two titles have indeed increased his popularity.  
 
 
 
2.3. Attitude of the PS towards the Issue of the Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe 
 
 
In the left-wing spectrum, the different approaches on the Treaty created intra-
party divisions. Although the PS established an official ‘yes’ position after having an 
internal referendum, there were powerful elements of opposition. Besides the PS, the 
Greens also officially supported the Treaty while having a significant number of intra-
party opposition. In the left, the opposition was formed by the PS number two Laurent 
Fabius, the mainstream Chèvenement’s Mouvement Républicain et Citoyens and as 
well as the Parti Communist Français, the Trotkyiste Ligue Communiste 
Révolutionnaire and Lutte Ouvrière. This designated the split over the CT in both parts 
of the political spectrum where the left and the right “did so both at the center and 
periphery”. 205 
The left-wing opponents of the treaty argued that a ‘no’ vote would be the 
declaration of hope for a kind of Europe that France wanted. For example, the 
Communist Party pamphlet prepared for the campaign stated this very clearly: “le NON: 
Un vote d’espoir.” (NO: A vote for hope). In this flier prepared and distributed by the 
Communist Party inviting those interested to a public discussion at the Sorbonne 
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University on May 14, it is stated that rejecting the treaty “is the condition of a new start 
of cooperation among states and peoples on a truly democratic foundation and freed of 
ideological fantasies but abandoning not at all the goal of Europe as a space of 
prosperity and a multinational collectivity carrying its weight in shaping the world’s 
destiny”.206 From the title of the pamphlet it is understood that the Communist Party 
was carrying a ‘no’ campaign to reject the kind of Europe that the treaty was intending. 
Saying ‘no’ in this referendum would create a new hope for the creation of a new treaty 
that would lay the foundation for a democratic Europe as a new multicultural entity 
which would be an example to the rest of the world for a more democratic and 
egalitarian system. By rejecting the current treaty the wild capitalist European project 
would be cursed. A democratic union of states and people at the European level would 
become a possibility which would be taken as a reference point by the world’s leftist 
circles. As a result, 98% of the communists voted ‘no’ in the national referendum.207 On 
the other hand, 60% of the members of the Greens (Le Parti Vert) voted ‘no’208, not 
rejecting the idea of the union of Europe, but rather rejecting the Europe envisaged by 
this Treaty. The high 40% ‘yes’ was an indicator of confusion, but the main struggle 
was within the PS due to share of votes, popularity and the role in national decision-
making.  
The only party within the European mainstream left that lived such a big division 
on the CT issue was the French PS. The opponents to the CT demanded an internal 
referendum within the party. For the first time since the Épinay Congress, the PS had 
made an internal referendum among its 120,000 members209 in 1 December 2004 to 
evaluate the party members’ support for the CT. 83.2 percent of the PS members 
participated to the internal referendum. As a result, 58.6 per cent voted ‘yes’. The 
internal referendum came after meetings and internal discussions, including 400 local 
meetings, in order to create a definite Socialist party position.210 Even if they had been 
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defeated within the internal referendum at a rate of 58.6 %, the opponents still 
continued their ‘no’ campaign during the national referendum. The ‘yes’ side was led 
by the party secretary François Hollande and the former prime minister Lionel Jospin.211 
The long rival of Laurent Fabius – the former Prime Minister Lionel Jospin - took the 
party’s official position and tried to influence the ‘yes’ position by organizing speeches 
in the national media. Similar to Laurent Fabius’ intentions for a ‘no’ campaign, Lionel 
Jospin’s move was considered as a step to reveal party majority support for his 
candidacy in 2007 Presidential elections. However, he did not return to the politics. 212 
The high turnout of 83% participation in the PS internal referendum regarding the 
CT was never seen in the history of Socialist Party, congress or designation, and the 
party had not reached this level of commitment from members ever before. Although 
François Hollande respected the 41% ‘no’ outcome in the internal referendum, he felt 
the need to emphasize the unity of the party with a single voice and stated as follows: 
“In a democratic organization as Socialist Party, we can only have one response because 
if there were two this would be strange. It is necessary to carry out a campaign for the 
idea that brings us together. Today what brings us together is the Treaty.”213 Thus, by 
this the socialist party leader called on the PS supporters to be on the side of the ‘yes’.  
The PS’s one of the major organizational characteristics is to maintain different 
factions. Due to this feature of the PS, it can be predicted that when the lack of a strong 
leadership emerged, it became very difficult to keep these factions together. 214 In Dijon 
in May 2003, in the last congress before the internal referendum, the radical wings of 
the PS were formed by Henri Emmanuelli and Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s ‘New World’ 
won 16.3 percent and Vincent Peillon, Arnaud Montebourg, Benoît Hamon and Julien 
Dray’s ‘New Socialist Party (NPS)’ groups won 16.9 per cent in the national congress. 
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Contrary to these attempts, François Hollande had his motion passed with 61.4 per cent 
majority.215  
When the motions presented in the 2003 Dijon Congress are analyzed, it will be 
seen that there were five major motions proposed. Among these, only one of them -the 
motion A- led by party leader François Hollande was in favor of “the European 
integration on the current model”.216 Of the motions, the motion A demonstrated 
François Hollande’s federalist and integrationist vision of Europe. However, the other 
motions presented by a few party members were relatively smaller than the first motion 
and were based on the Eurosceptic sentiments. The motion C identified the European 
integration as “a Trojan horse of capitalism”, the motion D defined EU as a mere “ free-
trade area without political or diplomatic power, without a social project”; and motion E 
denounced that they do not want that kind of Europe which were controlled by José 
Maria Aznar, Tony Blair or Silvio Berlusconi.217 Hence, although the different factions 
intensified the internal democracy within the party, they reflected different ideologies 
and provided chances for different approaches to actualize, but this situation also led to 
the split on key issues such as the Constitutional Treaty.  
Among the above motions, while only one of them –Motion A that favored yes- 
was given by those within the majority group in the party, no motion was given by 
Laurent Fabius -the PS number two - or other opponent figures within the majority 
group. The interesting point here is that Laurent Fabius did not give any motion in the 
Dijon congress, but after a short while he thought of acting as the leader of the opponent 
groups. When the analysis and the attitudes of the advocates of different motions are 
taken into consideration, Laurent Fabius’ ‘no’ attitude led to suspicion and ambiguities 
regarding the source and intent of his attitude.  
The party was divided into three different camps on the CT: the minority factions, 
opponents of the Constitution within the majority faction and supporters of the 
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Constitution.218 The ‘no’ campaign within the majority was carried out under the 
guidance of the key figure of the party, Laurent Fabius, who was ambitious to become 
the PS candidate for the presidential elections. His policy objectives considering the 
CT’s threat over French social insurance system did not only appeal to the socialists, but 
the French public in general.219 Besides the personal ambitions of Laurent Fabius and 
François Hollande, there was a deeper social divide on the part of the French citizenry. 
While one part was the beneficiary of globalization and economic liberalization the 
other part was excluded from its benefits.220 Laurent Fabius formed an independent and 
a powerful group named Ambition socialiste pour Europe as an opposition to the 
ratification of the Treaty within the majority group. Laurent Fabius’ présidentiable 
character had played a significant role on the establishment of the opposition group 
within the majority.221  
Just one week before the internal referendum in PS, the leader of the ‘no’ camp 
within the party, Laurent Fabius, was interviewed by the daily French newspaper 
Liberation. In this interview Laurent Fabius explained why it was, in principle, 
necessary for him to say ‘no’ to the referendum by criticizing and interpreting various 
debatable articles of CT regarding the objectives of the Union.   
 
Article I-3: (ex Articles 2 TEU, 2 TEC) 
The Union's objectives 
       …. 
2. The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security 
and justice without internal frontiers, and an internal market 
where competition is free and undistorted. 
3. The Union shall work for the sustainable development 
of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price 
stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at 
full employment and social progress, and a high level of 
protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. It 
shall promote scientific and technological advance. 
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It shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and 
shall promote social justice and protection, equality between 
women and men, solidarity between generations and protection 
of the rights of the child.222  
       …. 
 
His evaluation and criticism of the CT and particularly article I-3 was as follows:  
“This article juxtaposes objectives that don’t have much in 
common, such as price stability and child rights. Even the 
following can conflict each other during their implementation: 
between free competition and enduring development; between 
social market economy and search for high competitiveness. The 
third part of the text gives the key: competition is reinforced and 
the market is praised; what refers to solidarity and development 
is underestimated. The expressions of “social economy of 
market” and “full employment” appear once in the text, 
“competition” 27 times and “market” 78 times. In order to 
“attract” social democrat electorate, social objectives are 
granted; however, concerning concrete policies liberalism is 
engraved in detail all over the text.”223 
 
 With the above interpretation and by resorting to a leftist discourse, Laurent 
Fabius criticized this Treaty since it did not adequately emphasize the social market 
model and the realization of full employment. With its current form the CT was 
engraved with liberalism all over.  
Laurent Fabuis, besides criticizing the new provisions of CT, also associated his 
‘no’ campaign with the national level policies. He argued that saying ‘yes’ to the Treaty 
would mean to support President Chirac’s policies. Like the 2002 Presidential Elections, 
the PS supported President Chirac in the second ballot of the Presidential elections 
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against Jean-Marie Le Pen. Laurent Fabius argued that favoring the ‘yes’ camp would 
mean to support President Chirac for one more time. With using that kind of a rhetoric, 
Laurent Fabius tried to attract the PS electorates to the ‘no’ camp.224 In other words, the 
opposition with the PS accused the advocates of ‘yes’ campaign of being in the same 
line with the right wing government. The insistence on and execution of the ‘no’ 
campaign within the ranks of PS was an indicator of setting aside the party discipline 
and acting against the party’s official position. Although the results could be observed 
as a clear victory for the ‘yes’ supporters, after the internal referendum, the division 
within the PS over the CT had increased further. The debate giving rise to the split 
brought to light the type and extent of Euroscepticism within the party. However, the PS 
Euroscepticism which played a significant role in the ratification of the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe is not a “hard” Euroscepticism. The opponents of 
the CT within the Socialists are compatible with the EU integration rather than being 
against it. 225 
In order to have the French electorate to support the ‘yes’ campaign, in a press 
conference held on 14 February 2005, the leader of the ‘yes’ camp within PS, François 
Hollande, addressed the public as follows: “The French socialists’ campaign should be 
an intimate, clear and a socialist yes campaign. This is an intimate yes, because when 
associated with the CT, this ‘yes’ includes a development and progress for the European 
construction, and this permits all the French women and men to pronounce themselves.” 
He also added that for the socialists, the only issue in the referendum is the CT. No 
discussion should be carried out over Turkey or any other EU candidate.226 
 In the same press conference François Hollande, to create consent and enforce 
the ‘yes’ campaign, had delivered speech to the French public:  
 “Will there be a future for the Constitutional Treaty in 
Europe or not? If it won’t have a future due to the French 
rejection or due to the other countries which have not given their 
consent, then we will be ending up with a limited European 
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vision, limited by the Nice Treaty. This will be a Europe, broken 
down, a Europe in crises with no real future.” He further added 
that “a ‘yes’ vote will create a new European dynamics. On the 
other hand, a ‘no’ vote will only create a crisis whose outcome is 
quite unpredictable.”227 
 
Contrary to the ‘yes’ rhetoric of  François Hollande, as mentioned above, the split 
within the PS continued till the national referendum day of 29 May 2005 and was 
conducted by Laurent Fabius’ group and representatives of the minority factions. The 
intra-party divisions had a direct impact on the popular rejection of the CT meaning that 
the 56 percent of the PS supporters who had voted no in the national referendum formed 
30 percent of the country-wide rejection.228  
 
 
 
2.4. Attitude of the UMP towards the Issue of the Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe 
 
 
The main supporters of the CT from the right-wing political parties were UMP 
and UDF. In line with their traditional Eurosceptic positions and their deep concern for 
member state sovereignty, opposition to the CT in right-wing political spectrum came 
from the dissidents within the UMP such as Nicolas Dupont-Aignan’s faction named 
Debout la Républic (Stand up Republic), Le Pen’s Front National (National  Front), 
Philippe de Villiers’s Mouvement Pour la France (MPF), the Mouvement National 
Républicain (National Republican Movement /MNR), led by ex-FN number two Bruno 
Mégret, and Charles Pasqua’s Rassemblement pour la France (Rally for France (RPF)), 
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as well as a lobbying group named Chasse, Pêche, Nature et Traditions (Hunting, 
Fishing, Nature and Traditions/CNPT).229 
The indisputable rising unpopularity of both the Prime Minister and the President 
started in early 2003. The public discontent with the government had been embodied in 
2004 regional and European elections which meant great electoral losses for UMP. In 
addition, according to BVA-L’Express survey conducted in 20 May 2005, a week 
before the CT referendum day, the government popularity reached its lowest levels ever 
since 2002 with a 39 per cent of positive ratings for President Chirac and 21 per cent for 
Jean Pierre Raffarin’s government. 230 Although during the CT ratification process, the 
UMP was located in a ‘yes’ stance231 asserting that  “the charter would make the EU 
more democratic”232 which was contrasted to the Eurosceptic position of the former 
Gaullist PRP tradition, it was significant that the UMP supporters showed a high level 
of loyalty to the party decision and to unpopular President Chirac.233  
In order to gain public support to his ‘yes’ campaign and to announce his vision of 
Europe, The UMP leader Nicolas Sarkozy delivered a speech in Palais des Sports – 
Porte de Versailles – Paris on 12 May 2005, just two weeks before the national 
referendum. An excerpt from this speech is an indicator of his attitude toward the 
European project in a French style using very appealing concepts such as fraternity, 
civilization and a new cycle of prosperity:  
 
Saying ‘yes’ to Europe is to demand on behalf of youth in 
this very beginning of 21st century the right to a future of peace, 
of exchange,  opening-up and thus a future of fraternity.  
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The core of European message is that of the desire for 
fraternity between peoples (nations) of the same continent who 
confronted each other in different ways throughout history.  
 
Europe, a fraternity project 
Europe, an idea for a civilization 
Europe which was a dream and which is a reality today   
Europe deserves our most determined commitment. 
Europe is a great chance, a chance for a new cycle of 
prosperity, for a new impulse for our country.234 
 
With this announcement at Palais des Sports Nicolas Sarkozy especially 
emphasized that Europe was a fraternity project, that it was a visionary idea for the 
foundation of a new and civilized Europe, that they were struggling to create a new 
Europe for the European youth and a prosperous Europe in peace for all the states and 
citizens of Europe.  
There were opposing groups within UMP. The ‘no’ camp within the party argued 
that the CT would threaten the national sovereignty of the member states.235 The CT 
was mainly opposed by a minority group within the Eurosceptics composed of those 
organizing themselves under the slogan of “New Gaullists” headed by Nicolas Dupont- 
Aignan who was the Deputy and President of the organization formed a sovereignist 
faction called “Stand Up Republic” (Debout la Républic) defending the “republican, 
social, national and Gaullist ideals”236, Senator Philippe Marini and Deputy Jacques 
Myard who was the President of the “Nation and Republic” (CNR). CNR was a political 
club formed with the support of Georges Pompidou’s former Prime Minister Pierre 
Messmer who was the leader of the Presence and Gaullist Action association. However, 
although there were many such factions, on 6 March 2005 the national council of the 
party supported Nicolas Sarkozy’s motion considering a ‘yes’ to the CT with the 
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approval of 90.8 percent of the party members. 237 In his speech At the National Council 
of UMP delivered on the same day, Nicolas Sarkozy, with the slogan “L’Europe Merite 
un Oui” (Europe Deserves a Yes) declared his support of the ratification of the EU CT 
with a ‘yes’ campaign.238   
Contrary to the various left-wing groups’ oppositions to the CT as emphasizing 
“the threat to the French social model and the competition for French jobs which would 
result from social and fiscal dumping, the UMP dissident Dupont-Aignan criticized the 
Constitutional Treaty for being undemocratic”.239 One of the main arguments of the 
sovereignist and Far Right opposition to the CT was based on opposition to Turkey’s 
EU membership. Even though Nicolas Sarkozy was also against Turkey’s EU 
membership, in a similar manner with President Chirac he tried to separate Turkey’s 
accession to EU from the CT. To prevent dissent and to ensure unity within the party 
Nicolas Sarkozy actively participated in various meetings.  
The personality-based competition between President Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy 
showed itself during the CT ratification process.240 However, this leadership struggle 
did not prevent Nicolas Sarkozy to directly support President Chirac’s idea to ratify the 
Treaty with a national referendum. He was well aware of the risks and difficulties he 
would face during the referendum and to convince the French public for a ‘yes’. In the 
same speech he emphasized that with the referendum France got the opportunity to 
democratically decide on issues regarding the future of Europe which was a milestone 
in construction of Europe anew on democratic and transparent basis.241  
Nicolas Sarkozy, in seeing the split in the ranks of the PS regarding the 
ratification process, giving up his hopes for a ‘yes’ from the far left and the far right, 
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and in order to clarify his own campaign and UMP party position adopted more precise 
and on-the-spot elements in his messages such as the emphasis on the future of French 
children and the future of France:  
 
Voila. It is told. Our political message is clear. 
We want the best for the future of our children. 
We want the best for the future of France. 
We want the best for the new Europe. 
Europe deserves a ‘yes’ and we will vote Yes on May 
29.242  
 
 It was expected that besides UMP, the stance of the other important right wing 
party UDF would be taken into consideration by the mainstream right wing electorate. 
However, the process did not develop as the pro-European center-right Union pour la 
Démocratie Française (UDF - the Union for French Democracy) leader François 
Bayrou planned it. Despite the UDF leader François Bayrou’s criticism of the 
government’s national policies since 2002, the traditionally pro-European and federalist 
UDF supported UMP in the ‘yes’ campaign. Nicolas Sarkozy’s leadership of the UMP 
and President Chirac’s reputation as becoming the “best spokesman” for the CT led the 
public to undermine François Bayrou’s impact as a strong defender of the CT. 243 This 
showed that when both the president and the head of UMP adopted a ‘yes’ stand 
regarding CT, not much room was left to François Bayrou’s pro-European discourse 
and this did not elevate the effectiveness of his campaign in the eyes of the public.  
Besides UDF, the conservative MPF, lead by Philippe De Villiers, successfully 
placed itself in the ‘no’ camp of the CT by emphasizing the “national sovereignty” 
issue. During his ‘no’ campaign, Philippe De Villiers focused on the immigration and 
Turkey’s accession to the EU points and gained considerable popularity. 244   
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According to Ipsos poll results, in the period of the Maastricht Treaty establishing 
the EU the electorate of RPR, the ancestor of UMP, gave a 59.2 % ‘no’ vote. In May 
2005 referendum, this time those saying ‘yes’ were 80% of the total UMP electorates.245 
Although UMP made its decisions in loyalty to its own party official position, 
dissatisfaction with President Chirac and Prime Minister Raffarin’s UMP government 
was evident. For that reason, President Chirac, considering the discontent of this right-
wing electorate, deemed it appropriate to have a new government and the resignation of 
Jean-Pierre Raffarin took place a day after the referendum.   
After the resignation of Jean-Pierre Raffarin’s UMP government, the new 
Dominique de Villepin government’s policies which were established two days after the 
rejection of the CT tried to create a new enthusiasm. This new right-wing government 
got the message of the French electorate regarding their dissatisfaction over the 
economic situation. At this point, its priority was to overcome unemployment. 
However, the “unemployment” issue led to a division within the UMP between the 
“liberals” led by Nicolas Sarkozy and President Chirac’s supporters who were more 
confident to the role of state on economy. 
After the failure of CT, it is seen that France’s influence on European integration 
diminished. Therefore, in order to restore French dominance on European-level politics 
and as a way out of the constitutional deadlock, the UMP leader and the French 
presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy, at a meeting in Brussels on 7-8 September 
2006, proposed a “mini treaty”. Nicolas Sarkozy aimed to adopt the text during the 
German EU presidency in 2007 and to ratify it during the French [hopefully his] 
presidency in 2008.246 However, Nicolas Sarkozy’s suggestion of a “mini treaty” was 
only embraced by the British government, and thus the initiative was given up.247 
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Nicolas Sarkozy’s EU advisor Alain Lamassoure defined the “mini-treaty” as an 
initiative which aimed to sustain the legal innovations achieved since the Treaty of Nice 
(2001) and which gave powers to the EU institutions in order for them to operate more 
effectively. Alain Lamassoure further indicated that “this text will be drawn up with 
scissors, not with a pen”.248 He suggested that this mini treaty be curtailed down to 130 
articles from 448 and be preferably adopted by the national parliaments.249 That 
statement was important since the European CT ratification process brought tremendous 
debates within the EU member states, especially in France. Hence the new mini treaty 
was seen as an opportunity to restore both France’s dominance on EU and the Treaty of 
Nice.  
Nicolas Sarkozy’s four of the eight-point proposals within the “simple treaty” 
were about the decision-making procedures. The noticeable step was to change the 
unanimity voting system in certain areas and to enhance the qualified majority voting, 
co-decision and double-majority voting accordingly. The change in the voting system 
intended to prevent EU’s inefficiency when member states had disagreed over certain 
issues. In that respect, Nicolas Sarkozy’s plan brought “a more stable” European 
Council presidency rather than the six-month rotation. It introduced a European 
Minister of Foreign Affairs in order to strengthen EU’s power and credibility on the 
global scene.250 The mini treaty also envisaged that the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
would be binding certain countries such as France and Germany, and would not be 
binding some others such as UK.251  
The mini-treaty’s ratification process in France has reminded the failure of CT. 
The treaty was ratified by the parliament without taking it to national referendum. 
Moreover, the French European Commissioner Jacques Barrot and even the socialist 
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former Minister of Foreign Affairs Hubert Védrine supported the “limited ratification 
strategy”, for the ratification process.252 
France went through two years of inaction and crisis after the ‘no’ to the CT. In 
addition to this, and the passivism of President Chirac removed France from being a 
decision-making center in Europe. This period changed with the election of Nicolas 
Sarkozy as the president. Just after the presidential election results on Sunday 6 May 
2007, Nicolas Sarkozy addressed the French people with the following motto: “France 
is back in Europe”.253 Since he had already made a move with his proposal of a ‘mini 
treaty’, upon his election as the president his popularity increased considerably at the 
EU level.  
President Sarkozy tried to influence the EU decision making processes and 
intended to restore French power at the EU level. He thought that a politically and 
militarily strong Europe would be best for the French interests in the global level. For 
that reason, on August 27, 2007 President Sarkozy argued that “the construction of 
Europe will remain the absolute priority of [French] foreign policy. France is not strong 
without Europe, just as Europe is not strong without France.”254 Thus it should be 
remembered that President Sarkozy resorted to his earlier rhetoric on strong France 
within a strong Europe that he mentioned in his speeches such as the one in Palais des 
Sports – Porte de Versailles – Paris on 12 May 2005 as part of his CT campaigns.  
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2.5. From CT to Treaty of Lisbon  
 
 
On 23 July 2007 the twenty-seven member states of EU convened the 
Intergovernmental Conference in Lisbon to create a Reform Treaty. It was decided that 
a new treaty be prepared to take the place of CT. On 4 October 2007, the final version 
was completed by the legal experts and was submitted for the “concluding sessions of 
the foreign ministers and prime ministers”.255 Final agreement on the Reform Treaty 
was reached by the European Council in the summit held in Lisbon on 18-19 October 
2007.256 During the negotiations process to create the Reform Treaty, the European 
Commission and Parliament were also involved.257  However, according to Jens-Peter 
Bonde, who is a European Parliament’s Constitutional Affairs Committee member, and 
being one of those given the task of following the meetings and engaging in technical 
work, claimed that the public, experts and officers like him were all deprived of getting 
information on the meetings and the contents of the discussion.258  So it was ready for a 
nice approval by the head of 27 European democracies on 13 December 2007. The 
ratification of the Treaty by the member governments was targeted to be done by 1 
January 2009, some months before the European Parliament elections.259 
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The aim of Lisbon Treaty was to create a supranational power at the EU level 
mainly regarding the areas of human rights and judicial and foreign policy matters and 
also to affirm EU’s independence by making it a legal personality for a further 
integrated Europe. 260 In that respect Treaty of Lisbon was containing new provisions. 
The Treaty first of all aimed to create a more democratic and transparent Europe. The 
European Parliament’s role was strengthened by increasing the co-decision procedure in 
policy making. The increase of national parliaments’ involvement in the EU work led to 
a stronger voice for citizens261 whereby “not less than one million citizens who are 
nationals of a significant number of member states may take the initiative of inviting the 
European Commission… to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens 
consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the 
Treaties.”262 The right to withdraw from the union is given by the Treaty. Its second aim 
was to create a more efficient Europe with the creation of a more efficient decision-
making mechanism. In that respect, arrangements in the Council considering the 
qualified majority voting and the creation of the president of the European Council for 
two and a half years were intended. Thirdly, the Charter of Fundamental Rights became 
binding. Lastly, in order to create a powerful Europe on the global level, a legal 
personality for the Union was provided, and a new High Representative for the Union in 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy were put in place.263  
The new provisions brought by the Reform Treaty were considered to be the same 
as CT in its essence. The current Finnish minister of foreign affairs, Alexander Stubb, 
said that the Lisbon Treaty was 99 per cent similar to CT and the former French 
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President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing as the chairman of the Convention on the 
Constitution pointed out that the Lisbon Treaty is the same as the rejected CT and the 
format was changed to avoid referendums.264 
By avoiding the referendums during the ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty 
and by calling it a Reform Treaty the member states were able to cope with the crises 
arising from the failure to ratify CT by all the member states, especially France. This 
indicates that the fierce discussions and debates during the CT campaigns, the ‘no’ 
attitude of different sorts of parties from the left to the right, the internal party debates, 
the unexpected ‘no’ outcome within the PS, division of France almost into two camps, 
the final rejection of CT by France and its determinative adverse impact on integration 
at the EU level had shaken the EU project from its roots. The results of the referendum 
brought a failure for major parties on both sides of the French political sphere; the PS 
on the left and the UMP on the right. That is why a deeper and closer analysis of the 
French political parties’ attitude towards CT will provide us very valuable outlook 
regarding the future of European integration.  
The CT created a tremendous impact in French political sphere just after President 
Chirac declared that the CT would be ratified in consultation with a national 
referendum. The CT was not only considered as a reform project at the EU level politics 
but was also perceived as a national issue which would directly affect the domestic level 
politics. Both the leading parties on the left and right tried to overcome the issue 
successfully without irritating the electorate and to strengthen their positions within the 
course of the ratification process and thereafter. Besides the CT’s impact on the French 
political agenda, the result of the French referendum would have irreversible 
repercussions on the future of the European Integration and, contrary to the Dutch 
referendum, the French referendum could kill the CT opening the way for a problematic 
era for Europe. In that respect, it was necessary to analyze the causes and consequences 
of the discourses of the leading figures of the mainstream political parties- the PS and 
the UMP- their campaigns, the intra-party rivalries and the presidential statements and 
speeches during the referendum.  
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Although the leading left and right parties on the French political sphere 
positioned themselves to a great extend for a ‘yes’ outcome, the CT was rejected by the 
French electorate with 54.9 per cent ‘no’ vote deserving a detailed study of the issue. 
Besides, what also made the current study meaningful were the confrontations and 
divisions within the party ranks, especially within the PS.  
The French Socialist Party was the only mainstream leftist party which was faced 
with such a deep intra-party division on the CT among other Socialist parties in Europe. 
Henri Emmanuelli and Jean-Luc Mélénchon opposed the CT by proposing the 
sovereignist arguments and by criticizing the CT for being an ultra-liberal treaty 
confronting the French economic model. Besides, Laurent Fabius’ ‘no’ campaign 
generated the most effective opposition within PS. His attempt was observed as a tactic 
to acquire the party leadership. Weakening of François Hollande’s position within the 
PS could have paved the way for Laurent Fabius’ party leadership. Hence, the CT was 
used as a political tool in the rivalry between François Hollande and Laurent Fabius for 
the party leadership and at this point it became rather difficult to speak of the socialist 
values and ideologies. On the other hand, in the UMP ranks, it was mainly Nicolas 
Dupont-Aignan who formed a ‘no’ campaign by defending the republican, social, 
national and Gaullist ideals. But still, the majority of the party members had shown 
strong loyalty to the party decision. At this point, the party center took advantage of 
holding the power and positioned its electorate in favor of a ‘yes’ to the CT.   
 Finally, the CT referendum process developed in a context of inter-intra party 
power struggles rather than inter party politics and party ideologies. On the mainstream 
left, within the PS, Laurent Fabius used the CT as a political tool to acquire the 
leadership. On the mainstream right, the aim of Jacques Chirac was to increase his 
popularity and to push Nicholas Sarkozy to a secondary position. Hence, regarding the 
CT referendum, instead of the classical left-right dichotomy, power struggles between 
the leading politicians both in the PS and the UMP became the norm and their 
pragmatic rather than ideological attitudes were observed.  
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Chapter III 
Attitude of the PS and the UMP towards the “Turkish Issue”: a Narrative 
Approach 
 
 
 
 
In the recent French political agenda, one of the major issues is Turkey’s EU 
accession process. French politicians’ discourses generate fierce debates and in turn 
impacts Turkey’s membership. In this chapter besides discussing the leading French 
political parties’ approaches – Partie Socialiste (the French Socialist Party / PS ) on the 
left and Union pour a Mouvement Populaire (the Union for a Popular Movement / UMP 
) on the right- towards Turkey and especially on her accession to the EU, the 
Presidential level declarations on Turkey’s membership, Turkey’s impact on the 
campaign strategies during the 2005 CT referendum process, the effects of Armenian 
question towards Turkey-EU membership and the “Union for the Mediterranean” 
initiative will also be described narratively.   
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3.1. Turkey’s EU Membership: A Challenging Political Issue in French 
Political Discourse   
 
 
France, since the Post-World War II era, has associated herself with the European 
Project as being the “driving force” and the leader of the European project and idea. 
However, today France has strong doubts about her dominance over the project. Since 
the late 1960’s, Europe was faced with successful enlargement attempts, strengthened 
supranational institutions, and a salient economic domination of Germany after the 
unification. In other words, France is “no longer “la reine des nations” [the queen of 
the nations]”.265 These developments undoubtedly gave rise to a new Europe and 
disturbed France without any doubt. For France who aimed to regenerate her dominant 
position amid other EU countries, Turkey’s EU membership process has become an 
important political issue and the Turkish issue began to play a noticeable role in the 
political discussions and attitudes of PS and UMP toward Turkey’s possible EU 
membership. 
In December 1999, Turkey was officially recognized as an EU candidate and in 
December 2002 the European Council declared that if Turkey by the end of the 2004 
accomplished the political Copenhagen Criteria, the negotiations would begin without 
any delay. Hence, considering the goal of acquiring the EU membership, the Turkish 
government put into action many political reforms which have strengthened 
democratization, human rights covering the minority rights and also promoted “the 
civilian control of the military”.266 In October 2005, the accession negotiations have 
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started and since then one chapter was provisionally closed which was the chapter on 
Science and Research in June 2006. Moreover, EU opened negotiations on Enterprise 
and Industry in March 2007, Financial Control and Statistics in June 2007, Trans-
European Networks and Consumer and health protection in December 2007 and also 
Intellectual property and Company Law in June 2008. In addition, the European 
Council approved a revised Accession Partnership with Turkey on 18 February 2008.267 
Although, Turkey’s accession process into EU advances slowly, it preserves continuity. 
During the December 1999 European Council Helsinki Summit, when the 
European leaders decided to take into consideration Turkey’s EU candidacy, the issue 
did not have a significant place in the French national parliament or the public debates 
in the French political context and President Jacques Chirac decided alone on the issue 
without consulting with his party.268 This personal move of French President was later 
criticized by the different parties, especially by the UMP. 
The political debates in France revived at the end of 2002 with the former French 
President Valéry Giscard D’Estaing’s explanations. In an interview in Le Monde on 8 
November 2002, he declared that “Turkey is close to Europe, an important country, 
which has a true elite but she is not a European country” and he added that “her capital 
is not in Europe, her 95 per cent of population does not live in Europe, and she is not a 
European country”.269 
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In France, besides the former President D’Estaing’s explanations, the negative 
attitudes of the French citizens over Turkey’s EU membership have increased just after 
Sarkozy’s election as the leader of the governing UMP. Nicolas Sarkozy, during his 
leadership of the UMP and his candidacy for the Presidential elections, has consistently 
declared his opposition towards Turkey’s EU membership and positioned himself as the 
major opponent of the issue. President Chirac who was also not very enthusiastic over 
Turkey’s membership declared that the possibility of a “third way” which meant a 
special partnership for Turkey could be taken into consideration and suggested a 
national referendum for Turkey few weeks before the December 2004 European 
Council Summit. However, besides several adverse effects and the lack of enthusiasm 
on the part of some EU countries and the majority of the EU public regarding Turkey’s 
EU membership, the 16-17 December European Council Summit was a significant step 
for Turkey. Hence, in the Summit while presenting some conditions, it was declared 
that negotiations with Turkey could be opened on 3 October 2005.270 
While supporting the accession of Romania and Bulgaria into EU, Nicolas 
Sarkozy, the French Interior Minister and also the leader of UMP at that time, stood 
against the accession of Turkey not because of its religious identity but in terms of its 
geographical position. In other words, he argued that Turkey could not become a 
member of EU not because of its Muslim population but because it was mostly located 
in Asia Minor, except the little part situated in Thrace. 271 Moreover, in an interview on 
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16 July 2006 Nicolas Sarkozy insisted on a Europe without Turkey. He declared that 
“Turkey, as part of Asia Minor, does not have a place in Europe”.272 
 
 
 
3.2. The Impact of the “Turkish Issue” on the Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe Referendum in France  
 
 
President Jacques Chirac’s declaration according to which the national 
referendum would be the condition for the ratification of the CT paved the way for a 
period of fierce debates. The political parties tried to adopt the best strategy for them 
without losing any electorates. The governing party UMP supported the ratification of 
the Treaty and positioned itself for a ‘yes’ campaign and was not faced with a 
significant division within the party members. However, the French Socialist Party (PS) 
was confronted with conflicts during the referendum campaign process. After having an 
internal referendum, the party asserted itself to support the ‘yes’ position. But, the 
turmoil among the socialists was far from coming to an end. Besides, the official ‘yes’ 
position announced by the PS leader François Hollande, certain key figures of the party 
such as Laurent Fabius advocated the ‘no’ and forged an opposition campaign for the 
ratification of the Treaty which brought a dual campaign in one and the same party. 
During the referendum campaigns, these two leading rival parties that were 
situating themselves on the opposite sides of the left-right political axis tried to 
influence the French electorates and composed strategies of their own to strengthen 
their respective positions. In that respect, Turkey found herself on the center of the 
debates. As the majority of the French electorate was doubtful about Turkey, the 
mainstream political parties -the PS and the UMP- tried to explain that to say ‘yes’ to 
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the Treaty did not mean to support Turkey’s accession into EU and tried not to relate 
the Turkish issue with the CT. 
François Hollande, the leader of the PS and the defender of the ‘yes’ vote for the 
ratification of the CT, in a press conference held on 14 February 2005 criticized those 
who associated the CT with Turkey’s EU accession and indicated that PS’s official 
‘yes’ campaign was clear and did not allow for any confusions. In that respect, for 
François Hollande, the sole subject of the referendum was the Treaty and without any 
doubt Turkey or another candidate country should not have been associated with it.273 
With this explanation, François Hollande devised a clever policy to comfort his 
electorates opposing to Turkey’s EU membership and also aimed to get their support for 
the referendum. 
Just one week before the internal referendum of the PS, the leader of the ‘no’ 
camp within the party, Laurent Fabius, was interviewed by the daily French newspaper 
Liberation. In this interview, Laurent Fabius explained why in principle it was 
necessary for him to say ‘no’ to the referendum by criticizing and interpreting various 
debatable articles of CT regarding the objectives of the Union.274  In his explanation, 
Laurent Fabius indicated that the Turkish issue was among the reasons for a ‘no’. At 
this point he criticized the proposed CT articles such as Article I-25. 
Article I-25 regarding the qualified majority in the European Council and the 
Council is: 
Article I-25: (ex Article 205(2) TEC) 
 
---- 
A qualified majority shall be defined as at least 55% of the 
members of the Council, comprising at least fifteen of them and 
representing 
 
Member States comprising at least 65% of the population 
of the Union. (…). By way of derogation from paragraph 1, 
when the Council does not act on a proposal from the 
Commission or from the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, the 
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qualified majority shall be defined as at least 72% of the 
members of the Council, representing Member States comprising 
at least 65% of the population of the Union. (…)275  
 
His evaluation and criticism of article I-25 was as follows:  
The influence of a state over the Council will depend more directly than before on 
its demographic weight. This rule simplifies situations and it will not be necessary to 
review it for each enlargement, but it is necessary to keep in mind that “if Turkey 
becomes member of the Union, it will be the most influential country in the Council.”276 
Like many politicians in France, Laurent Fabius, by referring to the demographic 
structure of Turkey, implicated that with Turkey’s EU membership France’s power 
share and privileged position in EU institutions would be seriously damaged.  
However, the Eurobarometer “the European Constitution: Post-Referendum 
France” survey demonstrated that the efforts of both the PS and the UMP leaders that 
advocated ‘yes’ to the CT succeeded in keeping the CT away from Turkey’s EU 
membership issue. Only 6 per cent of the French electorates who voted for a ‘no’ 
indicated that they did not want Turkey in the European Union as the main reason.277 
France’s opposition to Turkey’s EU membership was also strengthened by the 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (CT) referendum results of 29 May 2005. 
The CT which aimed to reform the EU institutions and asserted to shape the future of 
the European Integration was rejected by the French people. Jean-Pierre Raffarin 
government’s resignation and the creation of Dominique de Villepin government was 
the first action led by President Chirac. As Turkey was used as a reason to explain the 
“no” vote during the CT referendum campaigns by the opponents, President Chirac and 
                                                 
275 The EU Constitution. 
276 Laurent Fabius website. 
277 Flash Eurobarometer 171, 17. 
 86 
the newly elected Dominique de Villepin  tried to appease the French public opinion 
that they were not actually in favor of Turkey’s EU membership.278 
During a debate in the National Assembly before the session in which the 
European Council would discuss the opening and the conditions of the negotiations of 
Turkey’s accession into EU, Jean-Pierre Raffarin, as the spokesperson of UMP, 
declared that “neither Europe nor Turkey are ready for the accession” (Ni l’Europe ni la 
Turquie ne sont prêtes à l’adhésion). According to Jean-Pierre Raffarin, Turkey’s 
integration contained risks for Europe in demographic and cultural terms. He spoke of 
the risk of demographic imbalance and also of integration problems due to the 
difference between two cultures; in his words “two worlds” were separate from each 
other. However, in the same speech Jean-Pierre Raffarin also highlighted the advantages 
of Turkey’s accession to EU. He argued that a stable, modern and democratic Turkey 
would be beneficial to France as well as to Europe and that it would be a reference point 
for its neighbor countries. Despite the fact that he recognized Turkey’s improvement, he 
expressed that time was needed and that the process of decision and dialogue would be 
long.279 By this way Jean-Pierre Raffarin who was one of the accused during the 
referendum on CT spelled out a softer ‘no’ by not directly contradicting Turkey, but 
politely stating that the two sides were not yet ready for Turkey’s EU membership.   
President Chirac, considering the French citizens’ fears towards the future EU 
enlargement waves, put a new clause in Article 88(5) of the French Constitution to 
provide for an automatic referendum for the candidate countries beginning with the year 
of 2007. That was a significant initiative because while excluding the referendum for 
Bulgaria, Romania or Croatia, the clause made sure to stipulate Turkey’s membership to 
a national referendum. Hence President Chirac aimed to disassociate Turkey’s EU 
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accession issue from the CT referendum debates and tried to win the French electorate 
who opposed to the CT on the pretext that the Treaty would facilitate Turkey’s EU 
membership.280 
Due to the demographical reasons, Turkey’s EU membership could change 
member states’ power shares in the EU institutions. By 2020, together with Germany, 
Turkey would be one of the most populated countries in Europe. Hence, large countries 
such as France would share their power with Turkey which would damage their 
privileged positions and decrease their power shares.281 Besides other reasons, because 
of the demographical concerns, the French politicians have got doubts over Turkey’s 
EU membership. 
Turkey’s population is predicted to be 82.4 million in 2015; 87 million in 2025; 
and 97 million in 2050. This population is not convergeable with its economic power. 
Europe’s demographically larger countries are Germany, France, Italy and the U.K. But, 
they also administer the largest European economies. However, in the Turkish case, the 
situation is not the same. 282 For that reason, it could be assumed that Turkey could 
change the dynamics in the European Parliament due to its size, could exploit Union’s 
economic capability and could harm the Union citizens’ standard of living. This 
controversial demographic and economic situation of Turkey is used by various French 
politicians like the PS deputy Jean-Michel Boucheron in the parliaments.  
In his speech, Jean-Michel Boucheron, the PS deputy of Ille-et-Vilaine, focused 
on the arguments of the opponents of Turkey’s accession to EU. He argued that neither 
the geographic nor the political criteria could be used as factors preventing Turkey’s 
accession to EU by underlining that the number of Turks in Europe is greater than that 
of Greeks and that Turkey has been a secular country for more than eighty years. 
According to Boucheron, the religious issue could not either be accepted because this 
perspective would harm the integration discourse directed to the Muslims in France. To 
accept these arguments would be a humiliating rejection, in other words it would mean 
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“You are not a part of us” (Vous n'êtes pas des nôtres). Instead, the integration of a 
country like Turkey with its 80 million habitants as well as its current institutions and 
budgets should be questioned. He considered these factors to be the only reason behind 
the impossibility of Turkey’s accession. However, he further stated that Turkey needed 
Europe as well as Europe needed Turkey. For that reason, the rapprochement with 
Turkey could not be suspended forever. In twenty years it will be vital to constitute a 
third pole that includes Europe, Mediterranean region and the Middle-East as a block 
against the almost homogeneous American bloc and the dominant Chinese bloc. In this 
third pole Turkey is given the key role.283 With this explanation Jean-Michel Boucheron 
emphasized the strategic importance of Turkey within and/or outside EU even if there 
are other factors on the contrary. Shortly, it would rather be very difficult and a big 
mistake to ignore Turkey.  
The French political parties which oppose Turkey’s membership into EU avoid to 
give references to Turkey’s being an Islamic country, because that sort of a Christian-
club rhetoric and an anti-Islamic discourse could damage the integration process of the 
Muslims within France, especially the North African Muslim immigrants. That is why 
the emphasis was made on economic, demographic, geographic and political reasons for 
the rejection of Turkey’s EU membership. For instance, an UMP deputy Dominique 
Paillé, in his speech at the National Assembly on 14 October 2004 emphasized the 
specific and distinct civilization of Turkey without humiliating her and that for that 
reason Turkey should not be an EU member. 284 
In the same session François Baroin, the general secretariat delegate of UMP, 
argued in a debate on Turkey’s candidature to EU in the National Assembly that 
Turkey’s position differed from that of Poland, Slovakia as well as the other ten 
countries. There had been a number of issues such as the situation of the Union once 
Turkey with its population that would approach 100 million in ten or fifteen years 
would be integrated and would have the largest number of deputy seats in the European 
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Parliament or the adaptation of the Union to the Turkish Islam. Besides these questions, 
the political as well as geographical limits (borders) of Europe were questioned too. The 
probable cost of Turkey’s integration on EU budget was another concern. In this 
context, UMP proposed a privileged partnership rather than a complete and full 
membership. “No to Turkey as a member State; yes to a partnership reinforced” (Non à 
la Turquie comme Etat membre ; oui à un partenariat renforcé).285 Thus, a privileged 
partnership formulation is proposed for Turkey without directly offending her.  
Although most of the French politicians disagreed on Turkey’s EU membership, 
there were some politicians who expressed positive arguments over Turkey’s EU 
membership. Michel Rocard, an effective member of the Socialist Party and a member 
of the Ahtisaari Commission, advocated Turkey’s membership. Michel Rocard in his 
book titled Oui à la Turquie (Yes to Turkey), gave a detailed account of Turkey’s 
reform initiatives and steps and the gains of EU when and if Turkey became a 
member.286 However, this approach of Michel Rocard did not have a significant place in 
the French political discourse. 
In addition to those who argued that Turkey’s accession should be left to time, 
there were others within the PS ranks who, while recognizing the inadequacy of 
Turkey’s economic and democratic conditions, pointed out to the failure of the method 
applied for the successive enlargements. In that respect,  Valls Manuel - deputy of 
Essonne – declared that Turkey should not be perceived as the sole scapegoat and that 
European leaders were also incapable of determining a clear vision and developing a 
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coherent project concerning the future of the Union. 287From this perspective, it can be 
said that the lack of a clear vision concerning the enlargement issue was viewed by 
certain PS deputies as an obstacle for Turkey’s accession to the EU. 
 
 
 
3.3. Nicolas Sarkozy in Élysee Palace  
 
 
The 2007 French Presidential Elections were considered as an important step both 
at the national level as well as at the European level. In the second round of the 
elections, on 6 May 2007, a classical left-right contest had been revealed out between 
the socialist presidential candidate Ségolène Royal and the Gaullist centre-right 
candidate Nicolas Sarkozy.288 Although attitudes of these two candidates towards 
Turkey seemed to be different from each other in the first instance, there was not a 
significant difference between them. Nicolas Sarkozy’s position was quite clear since he 
directly opposed Turkey’s EU membership. However, Ségolène Royal on the other 
hand, like the most PS deputies, while not ignoring Turkey’s membership, was not 
unconditionally supportive of it at all. By leaving Turkey’s EU membership to time her 
attitude was approaching to Nicolas Sarkozy’s.  
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With regard to Turkey’s EU membership, none of the actors wanted to take the 
responsibility of not having consulted the French citizens. Ségolène Royal, during her 
campaign in 2007 did not express a different view on the matter either.289 Thus, all 
throughout the election period, by emphasizing her need to consult to the public, she 
avoided taking the risk of losing the electorate opposing to Turkey’s EU membership.  
Nicolas Sarkozy, after being elected as President, has softened his tone and 
position over Turkey’s accession process, never thought of concealing his opinion that 
Turkey was not a European country. Although his predecessor Jacques Chirac was seen 
as a French President who was temperate in Turkey’s EU membership, in actuality there 
were not concrete differences between these two Presidents. President Chirac’s policies 
were full of ambiguity, he advocated Turkey’s EU membership and declared it many 
times; however, at the same time, he defined the need for a national referendum for all 
enlargement waves after Croatia’s entry.290  
Patrick Devedjian, a political adviser and former minister, criticized those in 
French left who considered Nicolas Sarkozy as “petit Bush français” (little French 
Bush) or “caniche de Bush” (kanesh of Bush) in an interview by underlining that 
Nicolas Sarkozy was the only one who had said to Mr. Bush that Turkey is none of his 
business and that it was up to the Europeans.291 Patrick Devedjian used the Turkish 
example in order to refute the French left position that Nicolas Sarkozy was closely 
affiliated with Georges Bush and his government’s policies. Thus, Turkey was present 
in the French political agenda not only with its future EU membership possibility, but 
also as a means in the political discussions between the left and right in French politics. 
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After becoming the President, Nicolas Sarkozy continued to be against Turkey’s 
accession to EU. He defended his argument by saying that EU was also a geographical 
concept and that Turkey did not have a place in it. Besides ruling out Turkey’s EU 
membership, he offered Turkey to accept the "privileged partnership” approach with 
Europe which was first used by Valéry Giscard D’Estaing - the former French President 
and the European Convention President during the preparation of the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe.292 
 
 
 
3.4. The Socialist Protégé over the Armenian Question 
 
 
The French National Assembly has accepted a new bill proposed by a small group 
within the PS ranks, on 12 October 2006, where the denial of the Armenian genocide is 
defined as a crime. This was a complementary law of the French Law of 29 January 
2001 that recognized the Armenian genocide. For the political groups opposing to CT, 
the future membership of Turkey to EU was a golden opportunity to be exploited and 
the issue of Armenian genocide was put forward as an argument to clarify their ‘no’ 
attitude towards CT. Even Nicolas Sarkozy, who declared many times that Turkey’s EU 
membership should not be related to the CT, stated that Turkey’s recognition of the 
Armenian genocide was a must for its EU membership.293 More than Nicolas Sarkozy’s 
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UMP, it was the PS which had the most pressure on Turkey regarding the Armenian 
issue. 
 Le Roux Bruno, a member of the Law Commission in the French National 
Assembly and a member of the PS, declared, “the Armenian genocide is a[n] 
[established] fact. What we are missing is that the judicial instruments permit negation 
of its condemnation tomorrow. The Armenian genocide is not a debate: it is a tragedy 
that left its mark on a people that can not be denied by anybody.”294 
For PS, the UMP support was significant for the Armenian issue which directly 
affected relations with Turkey. Jean-Marc Ayrault, the group leader of the French 
Socialist Party in the National Assembly, invited the UMP deputies to vote the bill 
proposed by the PS which forbade the negation of the Armenian genocide. Jean-Marc 
Ayrault asked how the UMP deputies would act especially after the statements of 
Jacques Chirac in Armenia. In the speech he gave in Armenia, Jacques Chirac had 
declared that the recognition of the Armenian genocide by Turkey should be a 
precondition for her accession to EU. Interesting enough, Nicolas Sarkozy had the same 
opinion and attitude.295 Ayrault also added that he would stay engaged to this debate on 
behalf of the socialist group.296 These remarks indicate that the Armenian issue was at 
the center of the PS attitudes towards Turkey. 
The Armenian French electorate had developed a two-fold relationship with the 
political parties. On the one hand, they had established close relationship with the 
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Dashnak Party - Armenian Revolutionary Federation – and with the left-wing parties 
such as the Communist Party and the PS, and on the other hand even if their numbers 
were not much they have formed well-organized vocal communities in small election 
regions around Paris, Lyon or Marseille.297 The continual close relationship between PS 
and the Armenian Dashnak Party affected PS’s approach to Turkey regarding Turkey’s 
EU membership. Moreover, the bill that forbade the denial of Armenian genocide 
submitted by a small group within PS was used by the different opponents of Turkey’s 
membership to EU both in the left and the right political spectrum. 
 
 
 
3.5. The Approach of the PS and the UMP to an alternative: “Union for the 
Mediterranean”  
 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, there were many initiatives for the Mediterranean; 
however none of them came closer to the expected objectives as the “Union for the 
Mediterranean” Project. In order to bring stability and peace to the Mediterranean 
region, the European Community and later on the European Union came with several 
initiatives. The ‘1972 Global Mediterranean Policy’, the ‘ 1990 Renovated 
Mediterranean Policy’, the ‘Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’ “within the framework of 
the Barcelona Process in 1995” and the ‘2003 New European Neighborhood Policy’ 
were the main projects prior to this one.298  
The European Council’s decision during the 13-14 March 2008 meetings which 
approved the principle of a Mediterranean Union could be seen as a turning point for the 
                                                 
297  Le Gloannec, “Marcus Aurelius”, 125.  
298 Roberto Aliboni, et al., “Putting the Mediterranean Union in Perspective,” 
EuroMesco Paper, No. 68, (June 2008). Available from 
http://www.euromesco.net/images/paper68eng.pdf . Accessed on 22 January, 2009, 4. 
 95 
European politics.299 The “Union for the Mediterranean” Project was a model for the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership which was actuated in Barcelona in 1995 and barely 
restored by the 2003 European Neighborhood Policy.300 The Project was first spelled 
out by Nicolas Sarkozy in February 2007 during his candidacy campaign for the French 
Presidency. Just after his election as the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy declared that 
France had come back to Europe, but it could be understood that his foreign policy 
objectives were wider than the borders of the European Union, spreading throughout the 
Mediterranean. 
Although there were serious objections, during the French Presidential term and 
with the initiative of Nicolas Sarkozy, 43 Heads of States and governments with 12 
International Organizations held a summit for the Mediterranean issue in Paris on 13 
July 2008.301 The summit ended with a joint declaration. The preface of the declaration 
underlined the need for “peace, democracy, cooperation and prosperity” in the 
Mediterranean302 and gave references to the Barcelona process stating certain objectives 
like “the building of peace, democracy, the non proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, the promotion of human rights and the establishment of a Free Trade Area 
in the Mediterranean”.303 In addition, the draft declaration brought new impulses to the 
Barcelona Process “by upgrading the political level of the EU's relationship with its 
Mediterranean partners; by providing for further co-ownership to [Europe’s]our 
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multilateral relations; and by making these relations more concrete and visible through 
additional regional and sub regional projects, relevant for the citizens of the region.”304 
However, the French Socialist Party had certain reservations regarding this 
meeting. François Hollande, the leader of the main French opposition party, and the 
Socialists criticized the timing of the summit and declared that the presence of dictators 
such as the Syrian president Bashar el-Assad was inappropriate on the 14th of July, a 
day when the human rights were celebrated in France. Besides, it was a humiliating 
scene for the French military to witness that its soldiers had to parade before Bashar el-
Assad.305 In that respect the socialists criticized the timing of the meeting without 
opposing its intent and the content. 
President Sarkozy’s project of a Mediterranean Union to which he attached so 
much importance could be seen as an initiative to keep Turkey out of the EU and 
besides to provide practical solutions for the questions such as migration, terrorism, 
energy security, trade and investments.306 From this move of Nicolas Sarkozy regarding 
EU’s enlargement process and the formation of a “Union for the Mediterranean” it 
became more and more evident that enlargement was used as a foreign policy tool by 
EU and that Turkey, together with the Mediterranean countries, would have a pivotal 
role in this policy. What was also very specific about Turkey was that it was a country 
in-between the core EU countries and the civilizations in the periphery of Europe. By 
this project EU would be able to position Turkey as a cushion for the development of a 
future European project within the context of CT as well as offering her a privileged 
partnership. By this way Turkey would play the role of a catalyst between Europe and 
its periphery.   
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The centre-left and the centre-right parties as well as their political leaders are 
preoccupied with Turkey’s accession to the EU. The UMP’s response to the issue 
derives from its Gaullist republican tradition and in that perspective; its negative 
approach towards Turkey accession to the EU could be perceived as part of its distant 
position toward EU enlargement. However, the decline in the UMP’s Eurosceptic 
discourse and the new role that it took as the initiator of the EU integration as well as its 
support toward Croatia’s accession drives us to question the negative attitude towards 
Turkey. As for the PS, it did not show a high level of support towards Turkey’s 
accession, contrary to what was expected from it as a socialist party. Emphasizing the 
need to leave it to time, the PS’s discourse concerning the issue was highly 
unenthusiastic. These developments demonstrate that these centre parties both on the 
left and on the right adopts the negative perception of French electorates over Turkey’s 
EU membership. In other words, power seeking centre parties in order to avoid the 
possible conflicts with their electorates act pragmatically and take a distant position 
towards Turkey’s accession to the EU. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
The long-prevailing left-right dichotomy determining the political agenda is 
increasingly becoming blurry and questionable today. In that respect, contrary to those 
who argue that the existence of the traditional left-right dichotomy became blurry and 
inadequate to explain the recent political reality without solving the new problems such 
as the environmental concerns, others advocated that the biggest dichotomy of the 
political sphere which began with a simple topographical matter in France on 28 August 
1789 still affects the world politics and maintains its significance. In this context, I 
assume that the content and the intent of the dichotomy have changed considerably. For 
that reason, I agree with the right-wing French philosopher Alain de Benoist who 
argued that the left and the right have both learned how to live with the other. The right 
began to touch more upon the social issues and the social harmony, and the left learned 
how to collaborate with capitalism and the free market economy. They both benefit 
from this collaborative process and come closer to the “center”. It means that the modus 
vivendi which forges the reconciliation between the two opposite political attitudes is 
expressive for today’s political discourses of the parties. That kind of reconciliation 
could well be observed as a sign of pragmatism. The political elites on the left and the 
right are no longer blindly dependent on their respective ideologies as the determinant 
factors of their survival. 
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France, where both this left-right dichotomy historically emerged and continues to 
prevail in various forms makes her more attractive for such a research. Besides France’s 
internal dynamics, the international developments led to the transformations of the 
French political tradition regarding the blurring of the left-right dichotomy. In other 
words, the economic and political changes facing the world, especially the European 
Integration process, had an impact on the changes in the Gaullist republican values of 
the mainstream right and the class-based politics of the mainstream left. Today, due to 
the increasing impact of the major determinants such as the market forces, global 
competition and economic rationalization, the idea of a centralized state and the state-
led approach was given up in France, even by the Socialists. In that respect, in order to 
enhance the French competitiveness, the European and international norms took the 
place of monist and the statist policies. Thus, it became more and more difficult for the 
classical ideological stances to find a place for themselves in the contemporary political 
arena. Hence, the changes in the world order considering the neo-liberal approach 
mostly affected the mainstream political parties to change their classical discourses. 
In France, both the PS and the UMP abandoned the dirigisme on economy and 
adopted the free market economy principles in order to accommodate themselves to the 
new world order. The disappearing of the ever important clerical-anticlerical split and 
the related controversies between the left and the right, the ending of the worker-
capitalist and class-oriented political confrontation between the left and the right parties 
with the rise of the middle class and integration of the working class with the capitalist 
system in France, the left-right dichotomy began to lose ground. 
Within the French context, the PS’s and the UMP’s discourses are very noticeable 
for the sake of analysis since, being the cornerstones of the French political spectrum; 
they determine and direct the French political agenda. Their analysis gives conclusive 
evidence regarding the left-right dichotomy debate within the French context.  
Furthermore, in order to limit the scope of the study, I preferred to examine the 
ratification process of the CT and the “Turkish case” as two significant indicators of the 
selected parties’ approaches towards EU integration and Turkey’s EU accession at the 
national and the European level politics.  
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The CT process was indicative of emergence of pragmatism within the French 
political spectrum which could be seen as the modification of the left-right dichotomy 
where these parties supported the ratification of the CT as a party policy. However, it 
should be observed that although the CT was the single issue consulted by the 
referendum, the domestic concerns such as the leadership struggles within these parties, 
the unexpected attitudes of the key party members, the referendum results revealing out 
key political issues, disputes, debates, and profiteering policy making marked the 
French political agenda. In this context, the referendum process was full of pragmatism 
which should not be evaluated solely from the perspective of classical party ideologies. 
The PS’ division on the ratification process which was not the case in any of the 
mainstream European Socialist Parties needed explanation. Some advocates of the ‘no’ 
to the ratification of the CT within the party such as Henri Emmanuelli and Jean-Luc 
Mélénchon were carrying out their campaigns by emphasizing the “sovereignty” 
concerns which was generally defended by the right-wing parties. By underlining the 
“grandeur of French state”, France’s preferences and the supremacy of the French law 
over the European law they adopted a nationalistic discourse over the CT. However, 
Laurent Fabius’ ‘no’ campaign was the most important one with deep pragmatic 
overtones. Laurent Fabius’ campaign for a ‘no’ to the CT was mainly based on a policy 
to take over the party leadership which was beyond the realm of ideological differences. 
On the mainstream right, the governing UMP, under the leadership of Nicolas 
Sarkozy, supported the ratification of the CT. It is highly probable that the ‘yes’ 
campaign initiated by UMP-based President Chirac triggered UMP to vote ‘yes’ as well. 
Only a minority group within the UMP opposed to the CT. The defenders of the ‘no’ 
campaign such as Nicolas Dupont- Aignan and Pierre Messmer formed different 
sovereignist factions by asserting the republican, social, national and the Gaullist ideals 
but still the support given by the party members to these initiatives remained low. 
Despite the fact that President Chirac was unpopular among the French citizens, 
and the support for Jean-Pierre Raffarin government was very low, contrary to the 
Socialist Party electorates, the UMP electorates showed a high level of loyalty to their 
party decision and adopted the ‘yes’ position with a great majority. These developments 
give us a clue about the division between the government and the opposition.  I assume 
that the PS electorates under the name of PS opposition have punished the UMP 
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government and President Chirac even if their party as a policy supported the CT. On 
the other hand, in the UMP, due to the advantage of holding the power, the electorates 
positioned themselves in favor of a ‘yes’ to the CT with a majority of 80 per cent. 
Meaning that, if the PS was in the place of UMP it would likewise face a very similar 
situation and vice versa. In short, the CT has never been solely perceived as a future-
oriented EU integration project in France. Through the CT, inter- and intra-party 
conflicts regarding the key domestic issues in French politics came to fore. 
The essential point towards the “Turkish issue” during the CT referendum 
campaigns was that both PS and UMP tried to not associate the CT with Turkey’s 
accession to EU. In that respect, leaders of these parties announced that the only issue 
which was consulted by the referendum was the CT itself and Turkey’s accession to the 
EU had no relation at all with the content or intent of the CT. Even President Chirac put 
a new clause in Article 88 (5) of the French Constitution which opened the avenue for 
an automatic referendum for the candidate countries beginning with the year 2007.307 
Thus, both sides of the French mainstream political spectrum acknowledged French 
citizens’ fears from the future enlargement waves and especially towards Turkey and 
acted accordingly. 
Considering Turkey’s EU accession, the real confusion was within the ranks of 
the PS. Although the PS deputies and the key party members emphasized that Turkey is 
a very valuable, great and strategically important country, they suggested that the 
“Turkish issue” should be left to time. The main factor pushing the PS to act in this 
direction was the reluctance of the PS electorate. In this context, the risk of adopting a 
policy against the will of the supports could not be taken since the majority of the 
French electorate was already against Turkey’s EU membership at the time. 
Both the PS and the UMP avoided highlighting the religious identity of Turkey 
because by referring to Turkey’s religious belonging, the Muslim minority in France 
would be offended. Instead the demographic, cultural, civilizational and economic 
criteria and concerns were discussed and addressed. Affiliation and association of the 
French left with the Armenian Dashnak Party and getting support from the Armenian 
diaspora had an adverse impact on Turkey’s EU accession process. Besides, President 
                                                 
307 Wolff and Mounier, 390. 
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Sarkozy’s “Union for the Mediterranean” initiative, while placing Turkey as a catalyst 
between the West and the East, aimed to implicitly exclude Turkey from EU 
membership by offering a privileged partnership. The attitude towards the ‘Turkish 
issue’ on both sides was mainly determined by the daily pragmatic political agenda. 
When both the PS and the UMP are analyzed from the perspective of their 
attitudes towards the CT and the “Turkish issue”, it will be observed that they shared a 
similar tendency and their policies converged to each other. While both had a ‘yes’ 
position regarding the CT, they were both reluctant towards Turkey’s accession to the 
EU. 
Regarding the “Turkish issue” we do not see any serious internal strife, leadership 
struggles and big divisions such as the one seen on the left in the case of the attitude 
toward the CT referendum. If the Turkish issue had been related to the CT referendum, 
it would have damaged their ‘yes’ position. Thus, both the PS and the UMP explicitly 
separated the two issues in order to not come into conflict with their voters in the CT 
referendum. As the power-seeker mainstream parties in French political arena, being the 
best-fit candidates for the government, both the PS and the UMP test the waters very 
well in general. IPSOS polls during the CT referendum process indicate that around 76 
per cent of the young French electorate did not favor Turkey’s accession to the EU308 
which makes it very meaningful on the part of both the PS and the UMP to separate the 
two issues. Thus, these two leading parties on the left and the right center of the 
political spectrum set their policies with reference to the real politics rather than 
ideological party positions. 
Finally, both the mainstream left and the right occasionally resorted to the other’s 
discourses while maintaining their positions in the center. The left, while touching more 
upon the social issues such as social justice and equality, also supported the liberal and 
capitalist policies. The right, on the other hand, while emphasizing liberalism more, also 
touched upon the basic social issues. In that respect both the centre-left and the centre-
right maintained their political positions without losing their respective electorate power 
bases. The aim of both parties then becomes to spread their objectives and to reach to 
                                                 
308 IPSOS Polls, “La Banque des Sondages (Data Bank),” Available from IPSOS Polls 
http://www.ipsos.fr/CanalIpsos/poll/8341.asp. Accessed on 20 February, 2009. 
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the maximum number of electorates possible to come to power. At this point the 
ideological differences between the centre left and the centre right become blurred. 
Hence, the classical left-right dichotomy is giving rise to a new dichotomy 
between the centre and the periphery. While both in the left and the right spectrum the 
mainstream parties are coming closer to the center, the parties excluded from the centre 
are pushed to the extremes where the dichotomy now manifests itself as a confrontation 
between the centre and the periphery on both the left and the right spectrums.  
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